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Abstract
This paper investigates the effects of exchange-traded funds (ETFs) on the real
efficiency of the underlying securities. We document strong evidence that being held
by ETFs increases the sensitivity of a firm’s investment to its own stock price. This
is consistent with the model prediction on the managerial learning channel. Higher
ownership by ETFs increases the firm’s stock price informativeness about systematic
shocks but may decrease the informativeness about firm-specific shocks; however, the
firm manager cares most and wants to learn from the stock price mainly about system-
atic shocks in making investment decisions as he already has precise private information
about firm-specific shocks. Consistent with the learning channel, we further find that
a firm’s investment becomes less responsive to its peers’ stock prices and its operating
performance improves after its ownership by ETFs increases. Overall, our study sug-
gests the positive effect of ETFs on real efficiency, even though their net effect on the
market efficiency of the underlyings is likely ambiguous.
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1 Introduction
The exchange-traded fund (ETF) industry has been growing spectacularly in the recent
decade.1 While undoubtedly popular among investors, ETFs have been found to possi-
bly destabilize financial markets by increasing systemic risk and inducing non-fundamental
volatility and excess co-movement.2 The debate on the benefits and the potential destabi-
lizing effects of ETFs is only just starting and a fuller understanding of the overall welfare
implications of ETFs is critical for regulators.3 As pointed out in a recent survey by Ben-
David, Franzoni and Moussawi (2017), missing to date is a welfare analysis exploring the
net effect of ETFs on market participants.
So far the academic research has largely focused on studying the effects of ETFs on the
informational efficiency of the underlying securities. The empirical evidence is inconclusive.
On the one hand, Israeli, Lee and Sridharan (2017), among others, document the dark side
of ETFs and find that firms that are widely held by ETFs experience a deterioration in the
informational efficiency regarding the firm-specific information. On the other hand, Glosten,
Nallareddy and Zou (2016) find that ETF activity facilitates the timely incorporation of
systematic earnings information into stock prices. However, the net effect of ETFs on the
informational efficiency of their constituents is ambiguous and difficult to evaluate.
While studying the effects of ETFs on informational efficiency is clearly important, a
more complete examination of the welfare implication of ETFs must include a study of
their effects on real efficiency. In fact, as Bond, Edmans and Goldstein (2012) argue, price
efficiency should be evaluated as the extent to which prices reflect information useful for the
efficiency of real decisions, rather than the extent to which they forecast future cash flows.
In this paper, we deviate from the line of the prior studies on ETFs and contribute to the
debate by studying from a different perspective — the real efficiency. We document strong
evidence of the positive effects of ETFs on the real efficiency of the underlying securities.
We first develop a simple theoretical model to show that a firm’s investment is likely to
be more responsive to its own stock price when firm ownership by ETFs increases. This
prediction is based on two premises. First, an increase in ownership by ETFs results in an
increase in the firm’s stock price informativeness about systematic shocks but possibly a
decrease in the informativeness about firm-specific shocks. Inclusion in ETFs introduces an
1According to Investment Company Institute, there were 1,751 ETFs managing 2.84 trillion USD in the
US market at the end of April, 2017. Around 10% of the market capitalization and 36% of the trading
volume of securities traded on US stock exchanges are attributable to ETFs (Ben-David et al., 2017).
2See, e.g., Ben-David, Franzoni and Moussawi (2018) and Da and Shive (2018).
3See, e.g., “Exchange-traded funds: Emerging Trouble in the Future? Regulators are worried that a
trendy new product will sow instability” (The Economist, Oct 25th, 2014).
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arbitrage mechanism that minimizes the price discrepancy between ETFs and the underlying
securities. The noise trader risk (DeLong et al., 1990; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) of a under-
lying stock is therefore reduced and thus informed speculators who have private information
about the systematic shocks of a firm (e.g., the beta of the firm’s projects) trade more ag-
gressively and consequently inject more private information into the firm’s stock price. Some
informed speculators who originally acquire information about firm-specific shocks may even
switch to acquire information about systematic shocks. Second, the firm manager has an in-
formation advantage over outside investors about firm-specific shocks and hence learns from
the firm’s stock price mainly about systematic shocks.4 Therefore, when firm ownership by
ETFs increases, the firm’s investment becomes more responsive to its own stock price.
Using a large sample of US equity ETFs from 2003 to 2013, we find strong evidence of an
increase in investment-q sensitivity being associated with a higher degree of ETF ownership.
This effect is robust to controlling for ownership by other institutions, employing various
estimation methodologies, as well as an extensive list of control variables. The economic
magnitude is non-trivial. One inter-quartile change of ETF ownership increase investment-q
sensitivity by about 10%.
Since the majority of ETFs are passive investment vehicles tracking well-defined bench-
mark indices, ETF ownership should be largely exogenous to other firm characteristics af-
fecting investment-q sensitivity. Nevertheless, to address endogenous concerns, we exploit
the Russell index reconstitution as an exogenous shift in ETF ownership, which has also
been used in other studies examining the effect of institutional/ETF ownership on financial
markets (Chang, Hong and Liskovich, 2014) and on corporate outcomes (Appel, Gormley
and Keim, 2016). Using this identification strategy and a two-stage IV regression, we show
that ETFs have a causal impact on the investment-q sensitivity of the underlying securities.
To further understand the channels behind the aforementioned empirical findings, we
ask why the firm manager does not simply learn about the systematic information from the
ETF prices and why the firm’s investment decision relies more on its own stock price as
ETF ownership increases. The channel based on our model is that the stock price contains
additional information about systematic factors (e.g., the beta of the firm’s projects) beyond
that contained in the ETF prices and the amount of additional information is increasing in
ETF ownership. Our empirical exercises verify this channel. We find that a firm’s stock
price predicts its future systematic earnings information after controlling for ETF prices and
4As argued by Bond, Edmans and Goldstein (2012), a firm manager may be the individual who is most
informed about the firm’s own fundamentals, but outside investors may possess an advantage over the
manager in collecting and interpreting external information such as the state of the economy or industry
demand.
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the ability of the current price to predict future earnings increases with ETF ownership. In
addition, a key cross-sectional prediction derived from the channel is tested and supported
by evidence, namely, the positive effect of ETF ownership on investment-q sensitivity is
stronger for a firm whose beta is more time-varying and less stable.
We test two other implications of our managerial learning explanation. First, the man-
agerial learning literature documents that a firm’s manager learns not only from its own
stock price but also from its peers’ stock prices in making investment decisions, as the latter
can contain industry-wide information not fully captured by its own stock price (Foucault
and Fre´sard, 2014; Dessaint et al., 2018). As a higher ETF ownership facilitates the incor-
poration of systematic information into the firm’s own stock price, this should reduce the
firm manager’s learning from its peers’ stock prices. Second, since a higher ETF ownership
results in an improvement in the quality of information relevant to real investment decisions
for the firm manager, the firm manager can make better investment decisions, which should
translate into higher future operating performance. Our evidence supports these predictions.
Finally, the managerial learning explanation developed based on our model also bears
several cross-sectional implications. First, the increase in investment-q sensitivity associated
with a higher ETF ownership should be stronger among firms in which systematic infor-
mation is more important. Using a stock’s market beta as a proxy for the importance of
systematic information, we find evidence consistent with this conjecture. Second, the ef-
fect of ETF activity on investment-q sensitivity should be more pronounced for firms facing
greater uncertainty of systematic productivity shocks. Consistent with this prediction, the
effect of ETFs on investment-q sensitivity is 4 times stronger among industries with more
volatile sales growth. Lastly, the improved systematic information in stock price induced by
ETF ownership should be more valuable to firm managers who are better privately informed
about firm-specific information. Using the profitability of insider trades as proxy for the
precision of managerial (firm-specific) information, we find supporting evidence.
We explore several alternative explanations for our main findings. First, recent literature
documents that passive institutional ownership may improve corporate governance quality
(Appel, Gormley and Keim, 2016). The improvement in governance associated with a higher
ETF ownership could by itself strengthen the relation between investment and stock prices.
If this mechanism plays a role in our findings, one should expect the increase in investment-q
sensitivity to be especially large for firms with poor prior governance. However, we do not
find support for this prediction. Using various firm-level measures of corporate governance
quality, we find that ETFs improve investment-q sensitivity only among firms with strong
corporate governance to begin with.
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Another alternative explanation for our findings could be that ETF ownership enhances
investors’ ability to forecast the impact of new investments on firm value. This is plausible
because some studies have shown that firms with a higher institutional ownership have better
disclosure quality,5 thus enabling investors to form more accurate forecasts. As a result, the
positive effect of ETF ownership on investment-q sensitivity may not be because managers
use stock prices as a source of information but rather because investors can evaluate the net
present value of new investments for these firms more precisely. If this mechanism is at work,
the effect of ETFs on investment-q sensitivity should be particularly strong for firms that
experience a relatively large increase in disclosure quality. Using analyst forecast accuracy
as a proxy for disclosure quality, however, we do not find such an effect.
The third alternative explanation for our findings could be the financing constraint story.
Firms held by more ETFs could have eased access to external finance and face less financial
constraints. This could strengthen the investment-q sensitivity by allowing firms to better
exploit investment opportunities. However, our evidence shows that ETF ownership does
not significantly affect a firm’s cost of capital or its access to external finance, suggesting
that relaxed financial constraints are unlikely to explain our findings.
While we cannot completely rule out alternative explanations for our main results, our
combined findings that ETF ownership increases a firm’s investment sensitivity to its own
stock price and decreases a firm’s investment sensitivity to its peers’ prices are more uniquely
predicted by the managerial learning channel and are difficult to be explained by alterna-
tives. For example, the story of an improvement in corporate governance would predict that
managers under better governance also respond more to peers’ prices which contain valuable
information about industry investment opportunities. Similarly, if ETF ownership is merely
a proxy for an improved information environment, investors should also be able to better
evaluate the impact of a firm’s investment decisions on its peers’ value, leading to a higher,
not lower, investment sensitivity to peers’ stock prices. Also, if the effect of ETF ownership
on investment-price sensitivity is driven by the financing channel, firms’ investment under
relaxed financial constraints should respond more strongly to industry investment opportu-
nities conveyed by peers’ stock prices, giving a higher, not lower, investment sensitivity to
peers’ stock prices.
Before closing the introduction, we need to explain why inclusion in ETFs, compared with
inclusion in index or traditional mutual funds including index funds, is specific to give rise
to the managerial learning predictions. First, an ETF can be actually traded by investors,
thus providing an “instrument” to investors to profit from potential arbitrage opportunities
5See, e.g., Boone and White (2015) and Bird and Karolyi (2016).
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when there is price discrepancy between ETFs and the underlying securities. However, an
index itself cannot be traded and hence such an arbitrage mechanism does not exist if there
are no ETFs tracking the index.6 Second, ETFs could be traded by investors on exchanges
intraday at low trading cost, while mutual funds could only be accessed by investors once
a day. In addition, investors can take leveraged position or short sell ETFs, so ETFs are
more effective instruments for sophisticated investors to trade on systematic information.7
Empirically, we show the effect of firm ownership by ETFs survives after controlling for
confounding effect of firm ownership by other institutions such as index and active mutual
funds and hedge funds (Section 5.7.1).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses how our paper is
related to and contributes to the existing literature. Section 3 formulates a simple model
featuring managerial learning from prices to develop testable hypotheses. Section 4 describes
the sample and summary statistics. Section 5 presents empirical findings. In Section 6, we
probe alternative explanations for our findings. Section 7 concludes.
2 Related Literature and Our Contribution
Our paper contributes to two strands of the literature. First, it contributes to the growing
literature examining the impact of ETFs on financial markets. Several papers have docu-
mented the dark side of ETF investing as non-fundamental demand shocks might be transmit
from the ETFs to their underlying securities. Theoretically, Bhattacharya and O’Hara (2018)
show that information feedback between ETFs and their constituents could cause propaga-
tion of shocks unrelated to fundamentals and market instability, especially for ETFs that
track hard-to-trade assets. Empirically, Ben-David, Franzoni, and Moussawi (2018) provide
evidence that arbitrage activities between ETFs and their underlying stocks increase the
latter’s volatility. Da and Shive (2018) document that higher ETF trading activity leads
to excess return co-movement among the constituent stocks. Hamm (2014) and Israeli, Lee
and Sridharan (2017) argue that ETFs can deteriorate liquidity for their constituents. On
the bright side, Subrahmanyam (1991) and Cong and Xu (2016) show theoretically that
initiation of basket securities could reduce speculators’ incentives to acquire and trade on
asset-specific information, but facilitate trading on systematic information. Empirically,
6Li and Zhu (2017) and Huang, O’Hara and Zhong (2018) provide empirical evidence that ETFs can be
used as arbitrage instruments to help correct mispricing of the underlying securities.
7Although index futures are also traded in exchange and have existed for long time, substantial differences
remain between futures and ETFs. First, ETFs may be more attractive to investors due to lack of margin
requirement and the absence of rollover risk. Second, while there are hundreds of sector and factor ETFs
actively traded in market, most index futures are benchmarked to broad market indices like S&P500.
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Boehmer and Boehmer (2003) find that the initiation of three ETFs increases liquidity and
market quality. Dannhauser (2017) finds that corporate bond ETFs have a long-term pos-
itive valuation effect on their constituents. Glosten, Nallareddy and Zou (2016) document
that ETF trading increases informational efficiency for stocks with weak information envi-
ronments. Li and Zhu (2017) find that due to the high liquidity and creation-redemption
mechanism, ETFs could relax short-sale constraints for difficult-to-short stocks.
Different from these existing contributions in this literature, our paper is the first to
study the real effect of ETFs. By showing that ETFs improve the real efficiency of their
constituents through facilitating the incorporation of new systematic information valuable
to managers, our paper highlights the importance of distinguishing between real efficiency
and informational efficiency in examining the effects of ETFs. Although ETFs may have
ambiguous overall effects on informational efficiency as they may have opposite impacts on
firm-specific information and systematic information as argued earlier, we show that the
effect of ETFs on real efficiency is always positive, considering that systematic information
is likely the incremental information that firm managers want to learn from stock prices.
Second, this paper contributes to the long-standing and important debate on whether
financial markets affect the real economy or is merely a sideshow. A list of theory pa-
pers have suggested the managerial learning hypothesis, which argues that when speculators
trade on their private information about a firm’s future prospect to make a profit, the stock
price aggregates a diverse set of information which is useful to real decision makers.8 Some
of the earlier empirical studies do not find supporting evidence (e.g., Morck, Shleifer and
Vishny, 1990). In contrast, numerous recent works have documented evidence supporting the
managerial learning hypothesis. Luo (2005) finds that managers are more likely to cancel ac-
quisition plans when the market response to the deal announcement is negative. Zuo (2016)
documents that a manager’s belief about firm fundamentals is positively affected by recent
stock price change. The majority of empirical studies on the managerial learning hypothesis
use the sensitivity of corporate investment to stock price as evidence of the real effect from
financial markets (Chen, Goldstein and Jiang, 2007; Bakke and Whited, 2010; Foucault and
Fre´sard, 2012; Foucault and Fre´sard, 2014). More recent studies have documented support-
ing evidence for the managerial learning channel by using a firm’s cross-listing status, the
staggered enforcement of insider trading laws across countries, and mandatory disclosure
regulation shock to proxy for changes of stock price informativeness (Foucault and Fre´sard,
2012; Edmans, Jayaraman and Schneemeier, 2017; Jayaraman and Wu, 2018). Besides learn-
ing from the firm’s own stock price, managers are also found to learn additional information
8See, e.g., Dow and Gorton (1997) and Subrahmanyam and Titman (1999).
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from peers’ stock prices (Foucault and Fre´sard, 2014; Dessaint et al., 2018; Yan, 2017). In
addition to real investment, the managerial learning channel has been documented to play
an important role in shaping firms’ product market strategy (Foucault and Fre´sard, 2018)
and compensation contracts (Lin, Liu and Sun, 2017).
An important theoretical argument developed recently in this literature is that financial
markets and firm managers have a comparative advantage in producing different types of
information (Bond, Edmans and Goldstein, 2012; Benhabib, Liu and Wang, 2018); manage-
rial learning from stock prices does not mean that managers are less informed than outside
investors, but rather means that managers want to learn some incremental information that
financial markets have a comparative advantage to produce. The effect of ETFs on the
informational role of stock prices is an ideal setting to test the theory. As ETF activity
changes the composition of systematic vs. firm-specific information in stock prices, our pa-
per provides supporting evidence that real decisions depend on the type of information in
stock price, rather than only the total amount of information.9
3 Theoretical Model and Hypothesis Development
This section presents a simple model to organize all of the empirical hypotheses in a unified
framework and in a structural manner. The model also helps clarify the economic intuition
and guide the empirical specification and interpretation. For these purposes, we keep the
model simple as in Dessaint et al. (2018) while relegating more microfoundation of the model
to Appendix A.
The model is sketched as follows. Conditional on learning from ETF prices, the firm
manager learns more from own stock price in making investment decisions when the firm is
more heavily owned by ETFs. This is because higher ETF ownership results in the stock
price’s informaiveness about the systematic shocks being higher while the firm manager
already has precise information about the firm-specific shocks. The reason is that inclusion
in ETFs introduces an arbitrage mechanism that minimizes the price discrepancy between
ETFs and the underlying securities, lowers the noise trader risk, and encourages informed
traders with private information about systematic shocks (e.g., firm’s beta) to conduct more
price discovery.
9See also Goldstein and Yang (2018) and Edmans, Jayaraman and Schneemeier (2017).
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3.1 A Simple Model of Managerial Learning
There are two dates: t = 1 and 2. At t = 1, firm i has a real investment project (or a growth
opportunity). After making investment Ki at t = 1, the firm realizes the project’s payoff at
t = 2 as
Y (Ki) = (ψimi + θi)Ki,
where mi denotes the macro-related or industry-related productivity shock and θi denotes
the firm-specific productivity shock, and ψi measures the importance of shock mi (relative
to θi). For example, mi takes the form of mi = βia or mi = a + βi, where a is the common
productivity shock to all firms and βi represents the impact factor of the common produc-
tivity shock to firm i. For simplicity and without loss of generality, we set ψi = 1 in the
main analysis of our model. The prior distribution of mi is mi ∼ N (µm, 1/τm). The prior
distribution of θi is θi ∼ N (µθ, 1/τθ). The cost of the investment is C (Ki) = 12K2i . The
(gross) interest rate between t = 1 and t = 2 is normalized to 1.
3.1.1 The firm’s information
At t = 1 when the manager of firm i makes the investment decision, he has several pieces of
information. First, he has private signals regarding θi and mi, namely,
sθ = θi + εθ with εθ ∼ N (0, 1/τsθ)
and
sm = mi + εm with εm ∼ N (0, 1/τsm) .
Second, the price of ETF(s) with a stake in the firm is available, which gives (imperfect)
information about mi, that is,
qi = mi + em,i with em,i ∼ N (0, 1/τqm) ,
where qi is called the ETF price-based signal about firm i (e.g., the ETF return coupled
with the historic beta of firm i). For example, qi can be interpreted as the information
based on the historic beta of firm i coupled with the available macro-level or industry-level
information inferred from the ETF price, while the relevant fundamental mi depends on firm
i’s future/forward-looking beta.
Third, the stock price of firm i is available. In the stock market of firm i, there are
two types of speculators: those who have private information about mi and those who
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have private information about θi. Importantly, speculators also know the public signal qi
(containing information about mi) in trading the stock. As in Grossman (1976) and Hellwig
(1980), the stock price aggregates the dispersed information held by speculators and thus
reveals information about mi and θi. The stock price also incorporates the public signal qi.
In Appendix A, we show that the stock price of firm i at t = 1, denoted by pi, is given by
φ0 + φ1pi + φ2qi = φ3mi + φ4θi + ni1, (1)
where φ0, φ1, φ2, φ3 and φ4 are coefficients, and ni1 ∼ N (0, 1/τn1) is the endogenous degree
of noise trading at t = 1. Lemma 1 follows.
Lemma 1 Firm j’s stock price at t = 1 is given by (1).
Let ω denote the ETF ownership of firm i (i.e., the proportion of firm i’s shares held by
ETFs). We examine how ω affects the stock price’s information content about mi and θi.
By (1), the stock price pi (combined with qi) provides an additional signal about mi, that is,
p˘i ≡ p˘(qi, pi) = mi + %m,i with %m,i ∼ N (0, 1/τpm) (2)
where p˘(qi, pi) ≡ (φ0−φ4µθ)+φ1pi+φ2qiφ3 , %m,i ≡
φ4(θi−µθ)+ni1
φ3
, and τpm =
1(
φ4
φ3
)2
1
τθ
+
(
1
φ3
)2
1
τn1
. Lemma
2 follows.
Lemma 2 The stock price provides an independent signal (orthogonal to signal qi) about
mi. Its precision, τpm, is increasing in ETF ownership ω (i.e.,
∂τpm
∂ω
> 0).
The intuition behind Lemma 2 is as follows. A higher degree of inclusion in ETFs causes
that the stock price will converge to its fundamentals more likely in the next period, thanks
to the arbitrage mechanism introduced by inclusion in ETFs. Consequently, informed spec-
ulators of mi face less noise trader risk in the next period, and thus these speculators will
trade more aggressively in the current period, crowding out the noise traders and injecting
more private information about mi into the stock price. Therefore, the stock price’s informa-
tiveness increases. There is another channel through which the stock price’s informativeness
about mi can increase. As ETF ownership increases, more speculators may endogenously
choose to acquire private information about mi; that is, the number of informed speculators
of mi may also increase with ω.
Because signal p˘i is orthogonal to signal qi and hence provides additional information
about mi beyond that contained in qi, τpm measures the amount of additional information.
9
Formally, we have
1
V ar (mi|qi, pi) −
1
V ar (mi|qi) = τpm,
which is increasing in ω.
Similarly, the stock price pi (combined with qi) provides an additional signal about θi,
that is,
p`i ≡ p`(qi, pi) = θi + %θ,i with %θ,i ∼ N (0, 1/τpθ) , (3)
where p`(qi, pi) ≡ (φ0−φ3µm)+φ1pi+φ2qiφ4 , %θ,i ≡
φ3(mi−µm)+ni1
φ4
and τpθ =
1(
φ3
φ4
)2
1
τm
+
(
1
φ4
)2
1
τn1
.
Lemma 3 follows.
Lemma 3 The stock price provides an independent signal about θi. Its precision, τpθ, is
decreasing or slightly increasing in ETF ownership ω.
The intuition behind Lemma 3 is as follows. Less noise trader risk in the next period
due to inclusion in ETFs results in an increase in the stock price’s informativeness about
θi. However, there is a counterforce: a higher ETF ownership may induce some informed
speculators who originally acquire information about θi to switch to acquiring information
about mi, so the number of informed speculators of θi goes down, which results in a decrease
in the stock price’s informativeness about θi.
3.1.2 The firm’s investment decision
We work out the firm manager’s investment decision. The firm manager’s information set
at t = 1 is I = {pi, qi, sθ, sm}. Hence,
max
Ki
E
[
(mi + θi)Ki − 1
2
K2i |I
]
=⇒ K∗i = E [mi + θi|I] (4)
which implies that
K∗i = E [mi + θi|pi, qi, sθ, sm]
= κ0 + κ1pi + κ2qi + κ3sθ + κ4sm (5)
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where κ0 is a constant coefficient, and
κ1 =
τpm
τm + τqm + τpm + τsm
φ1
φ3
+
τpθ
τθ + τsθ + τpθ
φ1
φ4
(6)
κ2 =
τpm
τm + τqm + τpm + τsm
φ2
φ3
+
τqm
τm + τqm + τpm + τsm
+
τpθ
τθ + τsθ + τpθ
φ2
φ4
κ3 =
τsθ
τθ + τsθ + τpθ
κ4 =
τsm
τm + τqm + τpm + τsm
.
When τsθ → ∞ (the firm manager has perfect information about θi), we have a cleaner
result:
lim
τsθ→∞
κ1 =
τpm
τm + τqm + τpm + τsm
φ1
φ3
lim
τsθ→∞
κ2 =
τpm
τm + τqm + τpm + τsm
φ2
φ3
+
τqm
τm + τqm + τpm + τsm
lim
τsθ→∞
κ3 = 1.
Considering that τpm is increasing in ω (Lemma 2), κ1 is increasing in ω and κ2 is decreasing
in ω (by noting that φ2 is negative).
10 Proposition 1 follows.
Proposition 1 If the firm manager’s private information about θi is precise enough, his
investment decision is more responsive to the stock price pi and less responsive to the ETF
price-based signal qi as the ETF ownership of the stock ω increases (i.e.,
∂κ1
∂ω
> 0 and
∂κ2
∂ω
< 0).
As the ETF ownership of the stock ω increases, the stock price contains more information
about mi and less information about θi. However, the firm manager already has precise
private information about θi and does not rely too much on the stock price to learn θi
anyway. Therefore, the firm manager’s investment decision becomes more responsive to the
stock price.
Also, it is easy to show that κ1 has the following additional properties:
∂κ1
∂τm
< 0, ∂κ1
∂τqm
< 0
and ∂
2κ1
∂ω∂τsθ
> 0; when τqm is sufficiently high,
∂2κ1
∂ω∂τqm
< 0; when τm is not too low,
∂2κ1
∂ω∂τm
< 0
.
10Coefficients φ1φ3 and
φ2
φ3
also change with ω, but their effects are dominated by the terms before them
(see the proof in Appendix A).
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3.1.3 The firm’s profit
Now we can examine the ex-ante expected profit of the firm. The firm’s realized profit at
t = 2 is
(mi + θi)E [mi + θi|I]− 1
2
(E [mi + θi|I])2 .
By exploiting the law of iterated expectations, the ex-ante unconditional expected profit of
the firm, denoted by Π, is
Π(τpm, τqm, τsm, τsθ, τpθ) = E
[
1
2
(E [mi + θi|I])2
]
=
1
2
[
(µm + µθ)
2 +
(
1
τm
− 1
τm + τqm + τpm + τsm
)
+
(
1
τθ
− 1
τθ + τsθ + τpθ
)]
.
When τsθ →∞ (the firm manager has perfect information about θi), we have
Π(τpm, τqm, τsm, τsθ, τpθ) =
1
2
[
(µm + µθ)
2 +
(
1
τm
− 1
τm + τqm + τpm + τsm
)
+
1
τθ
]
.
Considering that τpm is increasing in ω (Lemma 2), Π is increasing in ω. Proposition 2
follows.
Proposition 2 If the firm manager’s private information about θi is precise enough, the
firm’s future expected profit is increasing in firm ownership by ETFs ω (i.e., ∂Π
∂ω
> 0).
Proposition 2 shows the information value for the firm. When the firm manager has a
more precise signal about mi or θi, investment becomes more efficient because investment
can be more closely aligned with the realized productivity shock; otherwise, there is more
severe under- or over-investment, reducing the firm’s profit.
3.2 Empirical Predictions
We derive several direct predictions of the model. First, based on Propositions 1, Prediction
1 follows.
Prediction 1: A higher degree of ETF ownership of a firm leads to the firm’s investment
responding more strongly to the firm’s own stock price (i.e., ∂κ1
∂ω
> 0), after controlling
for firm learning from the ETF price.
In particular, Proposition 1 together with Lemma 2 implies the channel.
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Prediction 2: The increase in investment-stock price sensitivity associated with a higher
ETF ownership occur through the channel where the stock price contains additional in-
formation about systematic risk beyond that contained in the ETF price (i.e., 1
V ar(mi|qi,pi) >
1
V ar(mi|qi)) and the amount of additional information is increasing in ETF ownership
(i.e., ∂τpm
∂ω
> 0).
To test the channel, the model also gives a cross-sectional prediction. If the ETF price-
based signal already conveys a lot of information about mi, informed speculators can add
little additional information to the stock price. So the firm manager can simply learn from
the ETF price, rather than from the stock price. Formally, we have ∂
2κ1
∂ω∂τqm
< 0 following
Proposition 1. Prediction 3 follows.
Prediction 3: For a firm with its beta being less time-varying and more stable (i.e., τqm is
higher), the positive effect of ETF ownership on investment-stock price sensitivity is
weaker (i.e., ∂
2κ1
∂ω∂τqm
< 0).
Next, the model implies some cross-sectional predictions. In the main model, for simplic-
ity, we have set ψi = 1 (where ψi measures the relative importance of the systematic shock
mi). If ψi is not set as 1, it is easy to derive the property
∂2κ1
∂ω∂ψi
> 0. Prediction 4 follows.
Prediction 4: The increase in investment-stock price sensitivity associated with an increase
in ETF ownership is stronger among firms in which systematic information (relative
to firm-specific information) is more important (i.e., ∂
2κ1
∂ω∂ψi
> 0).
Moreover, in an environment with greater uncertainty about systematic shocks (a lower
τm), the effect should be stronger; that is,
∂2κ1
∂ω∂τm
< 0. In addition, when firm managers are
more privately informed about firm-specific shocks, the effect should be stronger (that is,
∂2κ1
∂ω∂τsθ
> 0). Prediction 5 follows.
Prediction 5: The increase in investment-stock price sensitivity associated with an increase
in ETF ownership is stronger among firms in an environment with greater uncertainty
about systematic shocks (i.e., ∂
2κ1
∂ω∂τm
< 0) and among firms with a higher degree of
managers’ private informativeness about firm-specific shocks (i.e., ∂
2κ1
∂ω∂τsθ
> 0).
To avoid complicating the algebra, we have assumed in the main model that the firm
does not learn from other firms’ stock prices. It is easy to relax this assumption by adding
another signal which provides noisy information about mi. Denote by κ5 the coefficient in
front of this new signal for the investment decision (5). This signal has a similar effect as
signal qi. By
∂κ2
∂ω
< 0 in Propositions 1, Prediction 6 follows.
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Prediction 6: A firm’s investment responds less to its peers’ stock prices when its ownership
by ETFs increases (i.e., dκ5
dω
< 0).
Finally, the model has implications for firms’ operating performance. By Proposition 2,
Prediction 7 follows.
Prediction 7: A firm’s future operating performance increases with its ownership by ETFs
(i.e., ∂Π
∂ω
> 0).
4 Data and Summary Statistics
4.1 Sample Construction
We obtain a list of all U.S. domestic equity ETFs that physically replicate the indices.11
We do so by first merging all ETFs (etf flag=F) in the CRSP mutual fund database with
securities in CRSP monthly stock file with the share code of 73. We parse the fund name
manually to tease out non-equity or non-domestic ETFs.12 Finally, we limit our analysis
to ETFs that physically replicate the indices by ensuring at least 20 underlying stocks with
holdings information available from the Thomson Reuters Mutual Fund holdings database
(S12). Our final sample contains 343 ETFs from 2003 to 2013. We construct ETF ownership
(ETFit) of each stock i in year t using the following equation:
ETFit =
∑J
j=1 SHARESijt
TSOit
where SHARESijt is the number of shares of firm i held by ETF j at the end of year t and
TSOit is firm i’s total number of shares outstanding at the end of year t.
We obtain stock price and return information from the Center for Research in Securities
Prices (CRSP). Investment and other accounting data are from Compustat. Analyst coverage
and earnings forecasts are obtained from I/B/E/S. We restrict our sample to common stocks
(share codes 10 and 11) traded on NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ, and exclude financial (SIC
codes 6000-6999) and utility industries (SIC code 4200). To control for the confounding
effect of total institutional ownership, we obtain the institutional ownership data from the
Thomson-Reuters Institutional Holdings (13F) database. We also compute each stock’s
11Most ETFs in the U.S. tend to physically replicate their underlying index. The Investment Act of 1940
requires ETFs to hold 80% of their assets in securities matching the fund’s name.
12We search for terms in fund names such as “international”, “world”, “ex-US”, “treasury”, or “municipal”.
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ownership by active and index mutual funds and hedge funds in a similar way. Mutual fund
holdings are avaiable from the Thomson Reuters Mutual Fund database (S12). Using the list
of hedge funds provided by Jiang (2017), we retrieve the quarterly holdings of hedge funds
from the Thomson Reuters CDA/Spectrum Institutional (13F) database. After excluding
observations without the necessary data (investment and standard control variables) for our
analysis, our final sample contains 26,270 firm-year observations from 2003 to 2013.13
4.2 Summary Statistics
Table 1 reports the summary statistics of the variables used in our analysis. Appendix B
provides their definitions in detail. We winsorize all variables at 1% in each tail to mitigate
the potential effect of outliers. Figure 1 shows that the average ETF ownership in our sample
has been rising continuously, from about 1.2% in 2003 to 5.0% in 2013, with a mean value
(standard deviation) of 2.7% (2.6%). These numbers are comparable to the ones reported
in Israeli, Lee and Sridharan (2017). The increase in ETF ownership is consistent with the
tremendous investment flow to ETF markets in the recent decade.
The dependent variables used in our analysis consist of the sum of capital expendi-
tures and R&D expenses (CAPXRND), capital expenditures (CAPX) and R&D expenses
(RND), all scaled by lagged total assets. The means (standard deviation) of these investment
measures are 0.11 (0.12), 0.05 (0.06) and 0.05 (0.10). This indicates that a firm’s annual
investment represents about 11% of its total assets, and is attributed equally to capital
expenditures and R&D expenses.
5 Empirical Analyses
5.1 ETF Ownership and Investment-Price Sensitivity
Investment sensitivity to stock price, as measured by the correlation between corporate
investment and Tobin’s Q, is a commonly used measure of managers’ (unobserved) learn-
ing from stock price when making investment decisions (Chen, Goldstein and Jiang, 2007;
Foucault and Fre´sard, 2012). Adopting this standard measure, we estimate the following
baseline equation to test whether ETF ownership (ETFit−1) positively affects the sensitivity
13Our sample ends in 2013 because we need to include the stock return for the next three years as an
important control variable in the investment-Q regression. Our result remains if we drop that control and
extend the sample period to 2016.
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of a firm’s investment (Investmentit) to its own (normalized) stock price (Qit−1):
Investmentit = αt + µi + β1Qit−1 + β2Qit−1 ∗ ETFit−1 + β3ETFit−1 + γXit−1 + it, (7)
where αt and µi represent the year- and firm-fixed effects, respectively. Investmentit is firm
i’s investment in year t measured by the sum of capital expenditures and R&D expenses,
capital expenditures and R&D expenses, all scaled by lagged total assets. Qit−1 is firm
i’s Tobin’s Q in year t − 1, defined as the market value of equity plus the book value of
asset minus the book value of equity scaled by the book value of asset at the end of year
t − 1. The key independent variable is the interaction term of Qit−1 and ETFit−1, and the
coefficient β2 captures the incremental effect of ETF ownership on investment-q sensitivity.
If ETF activity indeed increases the sensitivity of corporate investment to stock price as we
hypothesized, we should observe a significant and positive β2.
We follow the existing literature to control for firm characteristics X that could poten-
tially affect investment-q sensitivity and may also correlate with ETF ownership (Bushee,
1998; Lamont, 2000; Bates, 2005; Richardson, 2006; Biddle and Hilary, 2006; Almeida and
Campello, 2007; Beatty, Liao and Weber, 2010; Panousi and Papanikolaou, 2012). They
consist of (1) firm size and its interaction with Tobin’s Q (SIZEit−1 and SIZEit−1 ∗Qit−1);
(2) (residual) institutional ownership and its interaction with Tobin’s Q (INSTRit−1 and
INSTRit−1 ∗Qit−1); (3) cash flow and its interaction with ETF ownership (CFit and CFit ∗
ETFit−1); (4) three-year future return, RETit+3; (5) other control variables including the
reciprocal of total assets, book leverage, return on assets, cash holding and sales growth
(1/ASSETit−1, LEVit−1, ROAit−1, CASHit−1 and SGit−1).
The inclusion of institutional ownership enables accounting for the constraints that in-
stitutional investors imposed on firm investment. We do not have signed prediction on it
because the effect of institutional ownership on corporate investment could either be positive
or negative.14 We also include its interaction with Tobin’s Q because institutional ownership
could affect the informational efficiency of stock price (Boehmer and Kelley, 2009) and hence
investment-q sensitivity. In addition, a higher institutional ownership could improve corpo-
rate governance and force managers to make investment decisions that are more aligned with
shareholder value. Given the positive correlation between institutional ownership and ETF
ownership, we follow Glosten, Nallareddy and Zou (2016) and use the residual institutional
14On one hand, institutional investors can lead to investment reduction by restricting managers’ overin-
vestment tendencies or forcing managers to reduce long-term investments for short-term benefits (Bushee,
1998; Ferreira and Matos, 2008). On the other hand, they can also lead to an increase in investment by miti-
gating managers’ under-investment behaviors due to risk aversion (Bushee, 1998; Panousi and Papanikolaou,
2012).
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ownership INSTRit−1 (after orthogonalizing it w.r.t. ETF ownership) as control. Cash flow
is included as a control because a large literature documents the positive sensitivity of cor-
porate investment to cash flow (Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen, 1988). Prior literature also
documents that managers tends to increase investment when the firm is overvalued by the
stock market (Baker, Stein and Wurgler, 2003; Polk and Sapienza, 2009). We use a firm’s
stock return for the next three years to control for the misvaluation channel and expect a
negative coefficient. Following Chen, Goldstein and Jiang (2007), we also add the reciprocal
of total assets to control for the mechanically positive relation between investment and the
regressor caused by the same deflator (ASSETit−1).
Table 2 presents the regression results. Consistent with prior studies, a firm’s investment
shows a significant positive relation with its own stock price for all three measures of invest-
ment. Column (1) shows that for a firm not held by any ETFs, a one-standard-deviation
increase in Tobin’s Q leads to an increase of about 4.4 percentage points in firm’s invest-
ment measured by the sum of capital expenditures and R&D expenses. Columns (2) and (3)
suggest that both capital expenditures and R&D expenses are positively related to Tobin’s
Q.
Consistent with the hypothesis, the coefficient on our key independent variable (Qit−1 ∗
ETFit−1) is positive and significant for all three investment measures, with a magnitude
of 0.105 (t-stat=3.92) for CAPXRNDit, 0.041 (t-stat=2.70) for CAPXit and 0.058 (t-
stat=3.15) for RNDit. To see the economic effect, consider a one-standard-deviation increase
in Tobin’s Q (1.30). This is associated with an increase of 4.5 percentage points in corporate
investment for firms in the bottom quartile of ETF ownership, against an increase of 5.0
percentage points for firms in the top quartile of ETF ownership. This relative increase
in investment represents 5% of the mean level of investments. Moreover, β2 is similar in
magnitude for capital expenditures and R&D expenses. This suggests that ETF activity
has a similar positive effect on the sensitivity of capital expenditures and R&D expenses to
stock price.
Our baseline results are robust when we replace the residual institutional ownership
with the raw institutional ownership measure, when we vary the estimation methods by
replacing firm-fixed effects with industry-fixed effects or excluding all control variables, and
when we use alternative definitions of corporate investment (e.g., scaled by property, plant
and equipment). The strong and robust positive effect of ETF ownership on investment-q
sensitivity supports our main argument that ETF ownership of a firm has effects on its real
investment efficiency.
One thing worth noting is that although ETF ownership increases firm’s investment sen-
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sitivity to its own stock price, the overall effect of ETF ownership on the firm’s investment
is negative with a magnitude of -0.153 (β3 + β2 ∗ AverageQit−1) = −0.153). Similarly,
institutional ownership exerts an overall negative effect on corporate investment. This is
consistent with the idea that institutional investors discipline managers’ overinvestment ten-
dencies through various governance mechanisms. The coefficients on other control variables
have the expected signs, except for the coefficient on cash flow. The positive investment-cash
flow sensitivity as documented by the literature is only observed for capital expenditures,
but not for R&D expenses.
Lastly, we want to point out that in the regression (7), ideally, we would like to control
for managers’ own information set (i.e., {sm, sθ} as in our model). But because managers’
private information is not observable to econometricians, we cannot control for it. However,
the omission of managers’ own information, a common issue in this literature, will only cause
the true effect of ETFs on investment-q sensitivity to be underestimated.15
5.2 Do Managers Learn from Stock Prices in addition to ETF
Prices and Why?
Our goal is to show that a firm manager learns more from the information contained in
his own firm’s stock price when the firm’s ownership by ETFs increases (or his information
set improves). However, the result in the last subsection does not provide support for this
point yet. The reason is that we did not control for a manager’s learning from ETF prices.
As a result, we cannot rule out the possibility that the manager learns only from the ETF
prices and not from his own stock price. Investment responds more to the stock price simply
because the stock price becomes more correlated with the ETF price when its ETF ownership
increases. More concretely, let us consider the following scenario: the stock price does not
contain incremental (systematic) information above the ETF prices and the manager learns
only from the ETF prices. As the stock price becomes more correlated with the ETF prices
when the stock’s ETF ownership increases (Da and Shive, 2018), investment that is only
15Intuitively, after controlling for a firm manager’s private firm-specific information, the manager mainly
infers systematic information from the stock price; an increase in ETF ownership, resulting in an increase
in the stock prices informativeness about systematic factors, means that the response of the investment to
the stock price is stronger (i.e., β2 is positive). Without controlling for the manager’s private information,
however, a counterforce is introduced. The manager infers firm-specific as well as systematic information from
the stock price; because an increase in ETF ownership can slightly reduce the stock prices informativeness
about firm-specific shock, investment sensitivity to the stock price will drop slightly (i.e., β2 is biased toward
zero). In short, if anything, the omission of managers’ private information will cause the true effect of ETF
ownership on investment-q sensitivity to be underestimated (formally, in our model, without controlling for
sθ, the term
τpθ
τθ+τsθ+τpθ
in (6) becomes
τpθ
τθ+τpθ
, which is more rapidly decreasing in ω).
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responsive to the ETF prices will mechanically appear to be more responsive to the stock
price. In that case, however, the firm manager’s set of systematic information does not
increase with ETF ownership.
In this subsection, we conduct an additional test to address the aforementioned issue.
Specifically, we test Prediction 1 of our model, which states that the effect of ETF ownership
on investment-q sensitivity should be positive after controlling for the manager’s learning
from ETF prices.
To test whether managers learn from stock price of their own firms in addition to ETF
prices, we add annual ETF-level returns in the baseline regression. As a stock is held by
multiple ETFs on average, we average the annual returns of the top five ETFs holding the
largest number of shares of the stock.16 We also add the interaction of ETF-level return with
the stock’s market beta because the effect of ETF prices on investment should be different
for stocks with differential exposure to systematic factors, noting that this interaction term
maps to the signal qi in our model. Specifically, we run the following panel regression:
Investmentit = αt + µi + β1Qit−1 + β2Qit−1 ∗ ETFit−1 + β3ETFit−1
+ β4ETFRETit−1 + β5ETFRETit−1 ∗BETAit−1 + β6BETAit−1 + γXit−1 + it,
(8)
where ETFRETit−1 is the average annual return of the top-five ETFs in terms of ownership
of stock i and BETAit−1 is the stock’s market beta estimated at the end of year t− 1.
Table 3 reports the results. As we can see, the coefficient of ETFRETit−1 ∗BETAit−1 is
significantly positive for capital expenditures, but insignificantly negative when the depen-
dent variable is R&D expenses. This suggests that investment also responds to information
in ETF prices (corresponding to the signal qi in our model), especially when a firm is highly
exposed to systematic factors. More importantly, the coefficient of Qit−1 ∗ ETFit−1 barely
changes and is still significant for all three measures of investment. These results suggest
that a firm manager learns more from his own firm’s stock price as ETF ownership increases,
even when ETF prices are available.
Next, we examine the channel through which managers learn from stock price in addition
to ETF prices. The channel (Prediction 2) states that stock price contains incremental sys-
tematic information beyond what is contained in ETF prices and the amount of incremental
systematic information is increasing with ETF ownership.
To test this channel, we regress firm-level earnings at year t on past-year stock return
16Our results are similar if we use the top-three or the top-10 ETF returns as the explanatory variable.
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(RETit−1) and its interaction with ETF ownership (RETit−1∗ETFit−1), controlling for ETF-
level return (ETFRETit−1) and its interaction with the stock’s market beta BETAit−1.
Table 4 reports the results. Column (1) shows that the coefficient of RETit−1 ∗ ETFit−1 is
significantly positive, suggesting that the stock price indeed contains additional fundamental
information beyond what is contained in the ETF prices. In columns (2) and (3), we further
decompose earnings into systematic and firm-specific components and examine the earnings-
return relation separately. The coefficient of RETit−1 ∗ ETFit−1 is much bigger and more
significant for systematic earnings than for firm-specific earnings component. This result
thus supports the underlying channel that the stock price contains incremental systematic
information beyond what contained in ETF prices, and that the incremental systematic
information increases with ETF ownership.
To check the robustness of our result regarding the stock prices informativeness in Table
4, we also use annual data to replicate the main results of Glosten, Nallareddy and Zou
(2016) and Israeli, Lee and Sridharan (2017). Consistent with Glosten, Nallareddy and Zou
(2016), we find that ETF ownership has a significantly positive effect on the contempora-
neous earnings-return relation, and the effect is driven entirely by the systematic earnings
component (see Panel A of Table A1). More timely incorporation of systematic earnings
information also predicts higher return co-movement, so we examine the effect of ETF own-
ership on stock return synchronicity, following Israeli, Lee and Sridharan (2017). Consistent
with their study, Panel B of Table A1 shows a significant positive effect of ETF ownership
on price synchronicity.
The channel also implies a cross-sectional prediction based on our model (Prediction 3),
which states that the positive effect of ETF ownership on investment-q sensitivity should be
stronger for a firm whose beta is more time-varying and less stable. Intuitively, if a firm’s
beta is stable, the systematic information conveyed by the ETF prices coupled with firm’s
historic beta can already reveal a lot of information about the firm’s systematic factor, so
its own stock price adds little new information. To test this prediction, we create a dummy
“BETAV OL” that is equal to one when the volatility of a firm’s estimated beta is above the
sample median. We then interact this dummy with Qit−1∗ETFit−1. Prediction 3 implies the
coefficient of Qit−1 ∗ ETFit−1 ∗ BETAV OLit−2 should be positive. Results from Table A2
supports this prediction. The channel is also supported by the result in Table 3, where the
weak significance of the interaction between ETF return and the stock’s beta suggests that
the ETF price-based signal does not reveal enough information about the firm’s exposure to
the systematic factor.17
17Indeed, there is a large literature discussing the time-varying nature of beta (see, e.g., Fama and French,
1992, 1997).
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5.3 Identification Using Russell Index Reconstitution
5.3.1 Russell Index Reconstitution Setting
The identification based on cross-sectional and time-series variation in ETF ownership, which
underlies the baseline results in Table 3, can raise doubts if the firm-level controls fail to
capture characteristics that co-determine ETF ownership and investment-q sensitivity. Our
prior is that this is unlikely because most ETFs are passive investment vehicles following
well-defined benchmark indexes. In addition, our regression specification includes firm-fixed
effects, thus capturing time-invariant (unobserved) firm characteristics. Nevertheless, to
address the potential endogeneity of ETF ownership, we exploit the Russell index reconsti-
tution setting and use IV regression approach to establish the causal effect of ETF ownership
on investment-q sensitivity. The Russell index reconstitution setting has been used by sev-
eral recent studies to examine the causal impact of passive institutions on various corporate
policies, including corporate governance (Appel, Gormley and Keim, 2016), disclosure and
information environment (Boone and White, 2015; Bird and Karolyi, 2016) and payout
policy (Crane, Michenaud and Weston, 2015).
The underlying idea of this identification strategy is to exploit the discontinuous change in
ETF ownership when firms at the bottom of the Russell 1000 index are reshuﬄed to the top of
Russell 2000 index. The Russell 1000 and the Russell 2000 index represent the largest 1,000
and the next 2,000 largest stocks in U.S. and are widely followed by institutional investors
as benchmark indices. At the end of June each year, Russell Investments will announce
the index membership of stocks based solely on their end-of-May market capitalizations.
Russell also assigns a portfolio weight to each individual stock within the index based on its
end-of-June float-adjusted market capitalization.18 Because of the value-weighting nature of
Russell index, firms at the top of the Russell 2000 index are assigned much larger portfolio
weights than firms at the bottom of the Russell 1000 index (Chang, Hong and Liskovich,
2014). ETFs tracking Russell 1000/2000 will follow the portfolio weights of Russell indices
closely to minimize the tracking errors. Consequently, for every dollar invested in ETFs, a
very small portion is invested in firms at the bottom of the Russell 1000 index, while a large
portion would be put into firms at the top of the Russell 2000 index, even though these firms
are very close in terms of market capitalizations. This leads to a sharp discontinuity in ETF
ownership for firms near the 1,000 cut-off, as shown in Figure 2.
The validity of this identification relies also on the key assumption that firms cannot
18Shares that are not available to the public including shares held by another company or individuals that
exceed 10% of shares outstanding, by another member of a Russell index, by an employee stock ownership
plan, or by a government.
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precisely manipulate the index assignment. This assumption is plausible because Russell
follows an arbitrary rule based on the relative rank of a firm’s market capitalization at end
of May, which is driven by random price fluctuation. This assumption also implies firm’s
other (unobserved) characteristics should change continuously around the 1,000 cut-off.
5.3.2 Empirical Results
Following Appel, Gormley and Keim (2016), we use an instrumental variable strategy to
establish the causal effect of ETF ownership on investment-q sensitivity. Specifically, in the
first-stage regression, we use actual inclusion in the Russell 2000 (Incl2000it) as an instru-
ment to isolate the exogenous variation in ETF ownership ETFit. We also use the interaction
of Incl2000it with Tobin’s Q as an instrument for the interaction of ETF ownership with
Tobin’s Q (ETFit ∗ Qit), our key variable of interest (Wooldridge 2002). The regression is
run with year-fixed effect19 and standard error is clustered at the firm level:
ETFit = αt + β1Incl2000it + β2Incl2000it ∗Qit + β3Qit +
N∑
n=1
φnLn(Mktcapit)
n
+ δLn(Floatit) + γXit + it,
(9)
ETFit ∗Qit = αt + β1Incl2000it + β2Incl2000it ∗Qit + β3Qit +
N∑
n=1
φnLn(Mktcapit)
n
+ δLn(Floatit) + γXit + it,
(10)
where Ln(Mktcapit) is the natural logarithm of end-of-May market capitalization from CRSP
for stock i in year t, Ln(Floatit) is the natural logarithm of end-of-June float-adjusted market
capitalization of stock i in year t and X are standard controls in our baseline equation.
We include stocks’ end-of-May market capitalization because market capitalization is the
criterion of index assignment which might affect ETF ownership independently in addition
to index reconstitution. We also include end-of-June float-adjusted market capitalization
because it determines a stock’s portfolio weight within the index which will directly affect
ETF ownership.
The exclusion restriction assumption appears reasonable because there is no theoretical
or empirical work suggesting a shift from Russell 1000 to Russell 2000 will directly affect
the firm’s investment-q sensitivity other than through its effect on ETF ownership, after
robustly controlling for the index assignment variable (i.e., firm market capitalization). The
19We do not include firm-fixed effects because very few firms in our sample have index shift event between
Russell 1000 and Russell 2000 more than once.
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instrument relevance condition is evident from Figure 2 and can be measured by the signif-
icance and magnitude of the coefficient on Incl2000it in equation (9) and the coefficient on
Incl2000it ∗Qit in equation (10).
We estimate the first-stage regression using three narrow bandwidths (150, 200 and 250)
around the Russell 1000 cut-off. The results in Panel A of Table 5 show that the instru-
ment Incl2000it has a significant positive effect on ETF ownership for all three bandwidths,
confirming that Russell index membership is a strong instrument for ETF ownership. On
average, inclusion in the Russell 2000 leads to a 0.7-0.8-percentage-point increase in ETF
ownership, which is about a 30% increase relative to average ETF ownership. Similarly,
Incl2000it ∗ Qit is a significant instrument for the interaction variable Qit ∗ ETFit for all
three bandwidths. The robust results from the first-stage regression suggest that our in-
strument is valid. The predicted ETF ownership identifies the exogenous variation in ETF
ownership conditioning on market capitalization and firm-specific controls.
In the second stage, we use the predicted ETF ownership (ETFit(IV )) and predicted
Qit ∗ETFit (Qit ∗ETFit(IV )) from the first-stage regression to re-examine the effect of ETF
ownership on investment-q sensitivity:20
Investmentit = αt + µi + β1Qit−1 + β2Qit−1 ∗ ETFit−1(IV ) + β3ETF (IV )it−1
+
N∑
n=1
φn(LnMktcapit−1)n + δLn(Floatit−1) + γXit−1 + it,
The second-stage regression results are reported in Panel B of Table 5. It shows that
exogenous variation of ETF ownership has a significant positive effect on the investment-
q sensitivity. The results are robust to using all three bandwidth choices. Moreover, the
economic effect of ETF ownership estimated from IV regression is larger than that estimated
from OLS regression. Take the 250 bandwidth as an example. When investment is measured
by CAPXRNDit, the coefficient on Qit−1 ∗ ETFit−1(IV ) is around four (0.548/0.101=5.4)
times larger than that on Qit−1 ∗ ETFit−1 in OLS regression, while the standard deviation
of Qit−1 ∗ ETFit−1(IV ) is about a third of the standard deviation of Qit−1 ∗ ETFit−1. The
difference means that the causal effect of ETF ownership on investment-q sensitivity is about
80% larger than that estimated from OLS regression.
Overall, the strong positive effect of ETF ownership on investment-q sensitivity from
IV regression helps establish the causal impact of ETF ownership on the real efficiency of
underlying securities.
20In this regression, we also control for managers’ learning from ETF prices as we do in regression (8).
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5.4 ETF Ownership and Investment Sensitivity to Peers’ Prices
Our preferred interpretation of the positive effect of ETF ownership on investment-q sen-
sitivity is that the price of a stock with higher ETF ownership contains more systematic
information that is useful for manager’s investment decisions. The managerial learning lit-
erature finds that a firm’s investment depends not only on its own stock price, but also on
its peers’ valuations, especially when its own stock price is less informative (Foucault and
Fre´sard, 2014; Dessaint et al., 2018). The reason is that peers’ stock prices contain industry-
wide information not fully captured by a firm’s own (noisy) stock price, and hence is valuable
for decision makers. As ETFs facilitate the incorporation of systematic information into its
own stock price, peers’ prices become less useful to managers for the systematic information
extraction purpose. As a result, managers will rely less on peers’ prices when making invest-
ment decisions. Thus, we predict that the investment of firms with higher ETF ownership
will be less responsive to peers’ stock prices (Prediction 6).
To test the above implication, we estimate the baseline regression (8) by including the
average Tobin’s Q of peer firms (PQit−1) and its interaction with the firm’s ownership by
ETFs (PQit−1 ∗ETFit−1). The coefficient on PQit−1 ∗ETFit−1 captures the impact of ETF
activity on the sensitivity of the firm’s investment to its peers’ valuation. Following the
literature, we use the Text-based Network Industry Classification (TNIC) to identify peer
firms.21 This data is developed by Hoberg and Phillips (2010, 2016) through a textual
analysis of business descriptions of firms’ 10-K filings from 1996 to 2015.22
If managers indeed reduce their reliance on the information contained in peers’ prices due
to the improved (systematic) informativeness of their own stock prices due to higher ETF
ownership, we should observe a significantly negative coefficient on PQit−1 ∗ ETFit−1. The
result in Table 6 strongly supports our hypothesis. First, the significant positive coefficients
on the firm’s own Tobin’s Q and peers’ average Tobin’s Q are consistent with the literature
that managers learn new information from both their own prices and their peers’ prices.
Consistent with Foucault and Fre´sard (2014), the coefficient on PQit−1 is smaller than that
on Qit−1, suggesting that on average, managers rely more on their own prices than their
peers’ prices for new information.
More importantly, a firm’s investment responds less to its peers’ prices when it is heavily
21The data can be obtained from http://hobergphillips.usc.edu/idata/Readme tnic3.txt
22We choose TNIC over other industry classifications, such as the SIC and the North American Industry
Calcification system (NAICS), for two reasons. First, TNIC has less measurement error in industry clas-
sification because it is dynamic and captures changes in firms’ product market space in a timely manner.
Second, unlike the SIC or NAICS which are based on similarity in firms’ production processes, TNIC is more
likely to identify the set of firms exposed to the same industry demand shocks.
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owned by ETFs. The coefficient on PQit−1 ∗ ETFit−1 is significantly negative for all three
investment proxies. Moreover, the effect of ETF ownership on the sensitivity of investment
to the firm’s own price is still significantly positive and even shows a stronger magnitude. In
sum, the evidence in Table 6 supports the managerial learning hypothesis that managers of
firm with high ETF ownership find peers’ prices less useful because ETF activities facilitate
the incorporation of systematic information into their own prices. As we discussed in the
introduction, this negative effect of ETF ownership on investment sensitivity to peers’ prices
is more uniquely predicted by the learning channel and more difficult to be explained by
alternative explanations.
5.5 Cross-Sectional Heterogeneity
The effect of ETF ownership on investment-q sensitivity bears several cross-sectional im-
plications, as predicted by our model. First, the effect of ETF ownership on investment-q
sensitivity should be stronger among firms in which systematic information is more impor-
tant (Prediction 4). Second, the effect of ETF ownership should be more pronounced for
firms whose (systematic) productivity shock is more uncertain (Prediction 5). Lastly, our
model predicts that managers benefit more from the increased systematic information in
stock prices when they already have more precise private firm-specific information (Predic-
tion 5).
To test the above predictions, we re-examine our regression for subsamples differing in
the importance and uncertainty of systematic information, and the precision of managerial
(firm-specific) information. We use market beta as a proxy for the importance of systematic
information to the firm, the industry sales growth volatility as proxy for the uncertainty
of systematic productivity shock, and the profitability of insider trading as proxy for the
precision of managerial private information. We posit that managers are more likely to make
profitable trades if they are more privately informed about their own firms’ fundamentals.
Following the literature, we measure this profitability by the average one-month market
adjusted returns of following each insiders’ net transaction in that month.23 In all the
regressions, we also account for managers’ potential learning from ETF prices.
We define a dummy (Dumit−1) that equals one for firm i if its market beta, industry
sales growth volatility or insider trades profitability is above the median level of the entire
sample in year t − 1, and zero otherwise. We interact this dummy indicator with our key
23We obtain insiders’ trades from the Thomson Financial Insider Trading database, and as in other studies
(e.g. Dessaint et al., 2018), we restrict our attention to open market stock transactions initiated by the top
five executives (CEO, CFO, COO, President, and Chairman of the Board).
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independent variable Qit−1 ∗ETFit−1 and investigate the coefficient of this triple interaction
term (Qit−1 ∗ETFit−1 ∗Dumit−1). This captures the incremental effect of ETF ownership on
investment-q sensitivity for firms with a higher exposure to systematic factors, belongs to an
industry with uncertain growth opportunity and with better privately informed managers.
We expect a positive coefficient on Qit−1 ∗ ETFit−1 ∗Dumit−1.
Consistent with our expectation, Table 7 shows that the coefficient on Qit−1 ∗ETFit−1 ∗
Dumit−1 is positive for all partitioning variables and significant in two cases (while the
other one is borderline significant with a t-stat of 1.44). Column (1) reports the results
conditional on the firm’s market beta. The coefficients on Qit−1 ∗ ETFit−1 ∗ Dumit−1 and
Qit−1 ∗ ETFit−1 are 0.081 and 0.046, respectively. This means that the effect of ETFs on
investment-q sensitivity among high-beta firms almost doubles its effect among low-beta
firms. The result thus supports our model’s prediction that ETFs create more benefit for
firms in which systematic information is more important. Column (2) reports the results
conditional on the sales growth volatility of the industry to which the firm belongs. We
find significant positive coefficients on Qit−1 ∗ ETFit−1 ∗ Dumit−1, and the magnitude of
this coefficient is much larger than that of Qit−1 ∗ ETFit−1. The result suggests the effect
of ETF ownership on investment-q sensitivity in highly uncertain industries is 4.6 times
larger than those belong to industries with less volatile growth opportunity. Column (3)
shows the results conditional on managerial private information. Consitent with our model’s
prediction, the beneficial effect of ETFs for managers are more pronounced when managers
appear to possess more firm-specific information.
Taken together, our subsample analysis suggests that the positive effect of ETF ownership
on investment-q sensitivity is more pronounced for firms in which systematic factors are more
important and more uncertain, and when managers are better privately informed about firm-
specific information. The evidences substantialize the channels through which ETFs could
improve investment-q sensitivity is by facilitating more systematic information into stock
prices that is valuable to managers.
5.6 ETF Ownership and Future Operating Performance
A final implication of our model is that ETF ownership should improve a firm’s future
operating performance (Prediction 7). The intuition is that if ETFs indeed improve the
quality of information relevant to real investment decisions, then that should translate into
better future operating performance. To test this prediction, we regress the firm’s future
operating performance on ETF ownership and standard controls with firm- and year- fixed
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effects:
OPit+j = αt + µi + β1ETFit−1 + γXit−1 + it+j (11)
where the firm’s future operating performance (OPit+j) is measured by return on assets
(ROAit+1) and sales growth (SGit+1) in year t+1 and their three-year averages (AvgROAit+3
and AvgSGit+3). We include firm size (SIZEit−1), market-to-book ratio (MBit−1), book
leverage (LEVit−1), cash holding (CASHit−1), and institutional ownership (INSTRit−1) as
standard controls. If firms with a higher ETF ownership experience better future operating
performance, we should find a significant positive β1.
The results in Table 8 support this prediction for various measures of operating perfor-
mance. The coefficient on ETF ownership is significantly positive for three out of four oper-
ating performance measures. The only exception is when the dependent variable is ROAit+1,
which is positive but marginally insignificant. Furthermore, the positive relation between
ETF ownership and the firm’s future operating performance is economically meaningful. A
one-standard-deviation increase in ETF ownership is associated with a 0.54-percentage-point
increase in annual ROA and a 1.23-percentage-point increase in annual sales growth over the
next three years. These numbers represent 6.5% and 12.8% of the average annual ROA and
the sales growth rate, respectively. The results are consistent with the managerial learning
hypothesis that more informative stock prices facilitate more efficient corporate investment
(Durnev, Morck and Yeung, 2004; Benhabib, Liu and Wang, 2018).
5.7 Additional Tests
5.7.1 ETFs versus Index Funds and Other Institutions
In the introduction, we propose several reasons for why ownership by ETFs should facili-
tate investors trading on systematic information more, compared with ownership by index
funds or other institutions. The intraday liquidity and flexibility of using leverage and short
selling make ETFs as more effective avenues for sophisticated investors to bet on systematic
information, while index mutual funds are more likely used for buy-and-hold purpose. To
empirically verify the specialness of ETFs, we construct stock ownership by other prominent
institutional investors, including index and active mutual funds and hedge funds. We then
add firms’ ownership by all these institutions and their interaction with Tobin’s q in equation
(8). The result in Table A3 shows that index funds exert a positive but insignificant effect
on investment-q sensitivity. The result also shows that ownership by active mutual funds
has almost zero effect while hedge funds have significantly positive effect on investment-q
sensitivity. Importantly, controlling for the confounding effect of all these institutional own-
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ership barely affect the effect of ETF ownership on investment efficiency. Overall, our tests
confirm the uniqueness of ETFs for sophisticated investors arising from its high liquidity and
trading flexibility.
5.7.2 Firm Managers’ Firm-specific Information
In this paper, we assume that firm managers have relatively precise firm-specific information,
so a reduction of firm-specific informational efficiency of stock prices caused by higher ETF
ownership will not adversely affect their information set much. Although managers’ informa-
tion set is unobservable to us as econometrican, a key implication of the above assumption
is that the wedge between firm insiders and outsiders with respect to firm-specific informa-
tion should increase with ETF ownership. In this section, we test this implication using
the informativeness of corporate insiders’ trading activities. Intuitively, corporate insiders’
trading should become more informative when information asymmetry between insiders and
outsiders widens, as documented by prior studies (Aboody and Lev, 2000).
To that end, we extract insiders’ transaction data from Thomson Reuters’ insider filing
database and construct the insiders’ net purchase ratio (NPR) for each firm-quarter follow-
ing Lakonishok and Lee (2001). We then run a Fama-MacBeth regression of futuroe stock
returns on insiders’ net purchase ratio, and its interaction with ETF ownership. The results
are reported in Table A4. Column (1) shows that consistent with the insider trading litera-
ture, NPR positively predicts future stock returns. More importantly, the coefficient of the
interaction term between NPR and ETF ownership is significantly positive, suggesting that
insiders’ trades indeed become more informative when ETF ownership is high. In Column
(2), we control for the interaction of NPR with firm size and total institutional ownership,
which are highly correlated with ETF ownership. In addition, we also control for stock char-
acteristics commonly associated with expected return, including firm size, book-to-market
ratio, past 1-month return and past 12-months return. As we can see, inclusion of these ad-
ditional variables doesn’t affect the positive effect of ETF ownership on the informativeness
of insider trading. Overall, this test provides strong support to our assumption that firm
managers are not adversely affected by the reduction of firm-specific information in stock
prices arising from higher ETF ownership.
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6 Alternative Explanations
6.1 Improvement in Corporate Governance
Prior literature documents that passive institutional investors affect corporate governance
of portfolio firms. In particular, Appel, Gormley and Keim (2016) shows that exogenous
increases of passive ownership significantly improve firms’ governance quality, although other
studies suggest a deteriorating effect of passive institutions on governance (Schmidt and
Fahlenbrach, 2017; Bebchuk, Cohen and Hirst, 2017). Improved governance associated with a
higher ETF ownership could by itself strengthen the sensitivity of investment to stock prices.
Better governance can help align managers’ interests with those of shareholders and lead to
value-maximizing investment decisions (John, Litov and Yeung, 2008; Fre´sard and Salva,
2010). Furthermore, under stronger governance managers may be more responsive to the
price movements because these movements partly reflect shareholders’ views toward a firm’s
strategies (Foucault and Fre´sard, 2012). If the said mechanism plays a role in our findings,
we should expect the effect of ETF ownership on investment-q sensitivity to be especially
large for firms that have weak governance to begin with. The reason is that these firms are
expected to experience a large improvement in corporate governance due to the disciplinary
role of ETFs. In addition, the effect of ETF ownership on investment-q sensitivity should
be much weaker among firms not experiencing any governance improvement.
To test whether our results are driven by the improved corporate governance channel,
we partition firms into strong, neutral and weak governance subsamples based on firm-level
G-index and E-index.24 G-index (E-index) is constructed by adding one index point for each
of the 24 (six) (anti-)takeover provisions listed in Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003). Higher
index values imply weaker governance. We only use firm-year observations from 2004-2009
in this test because the G-index and E-index data are available up to 2008. Panel A of Table
9 reports the results of our baseline regression conditional on a firm’s governance quality.
When G-index is used as the partitioning variable, the coefficient of the interaction term
(Qit−1 ∗ETFit−1) is positive and significant (0.423) for the subsample with strong corporate
governance but insignificantly negative (-0.444) for the subsample with weak corporate gov-
ernance. The results are similar when we use E-index as the corporate governance measure.
This result indicates that ETFs improve investment-q sensitivity only among firms with
strong corporate governance to begin with, which is contradictory to the prediction from the
improved governance story. Instead, the result suggests that good governance is necessary
24Governance is strong when the value of G-index is below 6 and weak when the value is above 13, otherwise
it is (defined as) neutral. Governance is strong when the value of E-index is 0 and weak when the value is 5
and 6, otherwise it is (defined as) neutral.
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if managers are to use information contained in prices to maximize the value of investment
decisions.
To further rule out the improved governance channel, we examine whether our findings
are significantly weaker among firms without improvement in governance. Specifically, we
examine the effect of ETFs on iinvestment-q sensitivity for firms that do not experience gov-
ernance improvement. The result is reported in Panel B of Table 9. Column (1) reports the
estimation results for the full sample after merging with the governance measures. Column
(2) reports the coefficient on Qit−1 ∗ ETFit−1 for firms that do not experience governance
improvement in our sample. The coefficient of 0.177 (0.182) under G-index (E-index) is
not economically or statistically different from that reported in the full sample. Overall, our
tests point in the same direction that the higher investment-q sensitivity associated with ETF
ownership does not occur through the mechanism of corporate governance improvement.
6.2 Investors’ Enhanced Ability to Forecast Future Investment
Recent studies (Boone and White 2015; Bird and Karolyi, 2016) find that institutional
investors could improve firms’ disclosure quality, resulting in higher transparency and lower
information asymmetry. As an increasingly sizeable part of institutional investors, ETFs
could potentially improve a firm’s information environment, thus enabling investors to form
more accurate forecasts. Thus a plausible alternative explanation for our finding is that
ETF ownership enhances investors’ ability to forecast the cash flows of new investments. In
other words, the correlation between investment and stock prices could be stronger among
high-ETF-ownership firms, not because managers use stock prices as a source of information
but because investors can evaluate the net present value of new investments for these firms
more precisely. If this mechanism is at work, the positive effect of ETFs on investment-q
sensitivity should be particularly high for firms experiencing a relatively large increase in
disclosure quality. We use the accuracy of analyst forecast as a measure of the improvement
in investors’ ability to forecast future cash flows.
We measure the improvement in analysts’ forecast accuracy in a given year using both the
absolute change (∆Accuracy) and percentage change (∆PAccuracy) in the median analyst
forecast error for each firm. The forecast error is defined as the negative of the absolute dif-
ference between forecasted earnings and actual earnings dividend by actual earnings. Thus,
higher ∆Accuracy (∆PAccuracy) values imply a larger improvement in investors’ ability
to forecast a firm’s future cash flows. Depending on whether the (percentage) change in
analysts’ forecast accuracy is below or above the median value of all firms in each year,
we partition our sample into high and low forecast improvement groups, respectively. As
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shown in Table 10, we find no significant difference in the impact of ETF ownership on
investment-q sensitivity between these two groups. The coefficient on Qit−1 ∗ ETFit−1 for
firms experiencing a larger improvement in analysts’ forecast accuracy is similar to that for
firms experiencing a smaller improvement.
In sum, the findings in Table 10 show that there is no discernible relation between in-
vestors’ ability to forecast cash flows and the increased investment-q sensitivity induced by
ETF activities. Thus, our findings are unlikely driven by investors’ enhanced ability to
evaluate future investment.
6.3 Relaxed Financial Constraints
A third alternative explanation for why ETFs enhance investment-q sensitivity is that firms
held by more ETFs have eased access to external finance and face less financial constraints.
Easier access to external capital could strengthen the investment-q sensitivity by raising
investment when new growth opportunities arise on the one hand and raising stock prices on
the other hand, as the latter should reflect the net present value of new growth opportunities.
In this section, we examine whether ETFs could affect firms’ access to external finance, as
we are not aware of any existing studies showing the relation.
To that end, we regress the measures of financial constraints and the cost of debt of firm
i at year t on its ETF ownership at year t− 1. We use the measures of financing constraints
developed by Hoberg and Maksimovic (2015) based on textual analysis of Management’s
Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) section of firms’ 10-Ks, where a higher score indicates
more binding financing constraints.25 We use credit default spread (CDS) to measure the
cost of debt. We obtain annual change of CDS spreads from Markit. Due to data limitations,
the tests are performed for a subset of firms in our sample.
The results are reported in Table 11. In Column (1), the dependent variable is the
text-based measure of equity-financing constraints developed by Hoberg and Maksimovic
(2015). The coefficient on ETF ownership is insignificantly negative. In Column (2), the
dependent variable is the text-based measure of debt-financing constraints. The results show
that ETF ownership significantly increase debt financing constraints. Column (3) shows
that ETFs increase the cost of debt as indicated by the change of CDS spread, although
the effect is only borderline significant. Column (4) shows that firms held by more ETFs
significantly cut payout ratio (dividends+repurchases). Columns (5) and (6) show that high-
ETF-ownership firms issue less equity and debt, respectively. Overall, the results cast doubt
25We thank Jerry Hoberg and Max Maksimovic for sharing their data with us.
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on the alternative explanation that ETFs improve investment-q sensitivity mainly because
they improve firms’ access to external financing.
7 Conclusion
This paper examines the effect of rising ETF ownership on the real efficiency of the underlying
constituents. We develop a theoretical model featuring managerial learning from prices,
and show that ETFs could increase the investment sensitivity to stock prices because they
facilitate the incorporation of systematic information into stock price, which is valuable to
firm managers.
Consistent with the main predictions of our model, we find that ETF ownership exerts a
strong positive effect on the sensitivity of corporate investment to stock prices. This finding
is robust to a host of estimation methods, different measures of corporate investment and
an extensive list of controls. Using Russell index reconstitution as an exogenous shock to
ETF ownership, we establish that ETFs have a causal impact on the real efficiency of the
underlying stocks. We also document supporting evidence for the cross-sectional implications
of our model.
We further test two additional implications of the managerial learning channel that our
model studies. First, we look at the effect of ETF ownership on managers’ learning from their
peers’ stock prices. Consistent with the model’s prediction, managers reduce their reliance on
peers’ stock prices to guide their investment decisions when their own firms’ ETF ownership
increase. Second, we examine whether ETFs improve firms’ future operating performance
as the model predicts. The evidence is supportive.
Our results have important policy implications that ETFs help improve the real efficiency
of the underlying securities, even though their net effect on the market efficiency of the
underlying securities is likely ambiguous.
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Appendix
A Proofs
Proof of Lemmas 1-3: We provide a micro-foundation for the stock price formation in
(1). Note that the feedback literature shows that when a firm’s stock price affects and reflects
investment decisions, the stock price is typically non-linear (e.g., Goldstein, Ozdenoren and
Yuan (2013) and Sockin and Xiong (2015)). For simplicity and for our purpose of guiding
the empirical analysis, we follow the approach of Subrahmanyam and Titman (1999) and
Dessaint et al. (2018), where the firm’s investment is a growth opportunity, traded sep-
arately from its assets in place. That is, the stock price of the established business (i.e.,
assets in place) only influences, not reflecting, the investment decision of developing a new
product/business (i.e., growth opportunity). The fundamentals of the new business are the
same as or similar to those of the established business.
The fundamentals (i.e., cash flow) of the assets in place at t = 2 are represented by
mi+θi. We work out the trading stock price of the established business (i.e., assets in place)
at t = 1.
We assume that there are two types of speculators: those who have private information
about mi and those who have private information about θi. For the first type, speculator
h′s signal is xmh = mi + mh , where 
m
h ∼ N (0, 1/τxm); for the second type, speculator k′s
signal is xθk = θi + 
θ
k, where 
θ
k ∼ N (0, 1/τxθ). The measure of the first type is λ1 and
the measure of the second type is λ2. All speculators are short-lived and maximize the
utility at the end of the next period. The utility function of a speculator is assumed to be
U(W h) = − exp (−γ¯W h), where W h is the wealth of speculator h at t = 2 and γ¯ is the risk
aversion (CARA) coefficient. The (gross) interest rate between t = 1 and t = 2 is normalized
to 1.
The total supply of the stock is normalized to 1 unit. As in Cong and Xu (2016),
we assume that there are two types of noise traders: macro-related and firm-specific ones.
The demand from the first type is nMit ∼ N
(
0, 1/τMnt
)
and that from the second type is
nFit ∼ N
(
0, 1/τFnt
)
at time t, where nMit and n
F
it are independent and each is independent
across time t. Denote the total demand by noise traders at t by nit ≡ nMit + nFit , where
nit ∼ N (0, 1/τnt) and τnt ≡ 11/τMnt+1/τFnt .
Because of the presence of noise trading at t = 2 as well as at t = 1, the stock price at
t = 2 is a linear function of mi, θi and ni2. For simplicity and without loss of generality,
the stock price at t = 2 is specified as pi2 = mi + θi + ni2, where ni2 should be interpreted
as the price impact of noise traders at t = 2 (by considering that the coefficients before mi
and θi are given). So speculators who trade at t = 1 face fundamental risk and noise trader
risk (i.e., the term ni2) at t = 1. We conjecture that the stock price at t = 1, denoted by pi,
takes the form:
φ0 + φ1pi + φ2qi = φ3mi + φ4θi + ni1, (A.1)
where φ0, φ1, φ2, φ3, and φ4 are coefficients. Combined with qi, price pi is converted into a
signal about mi, that is,
p˘i ≡ p˘(qi, pi) = (φ0 − φ4µθ) + φ1pi + φ2qi
φ3
= mi + %m,i with %m,i ∼ N (0, 1/τpm) , (A.2)
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where %m,i ≡ φ4(θi−µθ)+ni1φ3 and τpm = 1(φ4
φ3
)2
1
τθ
+
(
1
φ3
)2
1
τn1
. Similarly, price pi provides a signal
about θi, that is,
p`i ≡ p`(qi, pi) = (φ0 − φ3µm) + φ1pi + φ2qi
φ4
= θi + %θ,i with %θ,i ∼ N (0, 1/τpθ) , (A.3)
where %θ,i ≡ φ3(mi−µm)+ni1φ4 and τpθ = 1(φ3
φ4
)2
1
τm
+
(
1
φ4
)2
1
τn1
.
At t = 1, for the first type speculator h, his information set is {xmh, qi, pi}, which one-
to-one maps to {xmh, qi, p˘i, p`i}, so the utility maximization gives his demand for the stock:
dh =
E[pi2|mi + mh , qi, p˘i, p`i]− pi
γ¯V ar[pi2|mi + mh , qi, p˘i, p`i]
=
1
τm+τqm+τpm+τxm
[τmµm + τqmqi + τpmp˘i + τxm (mi + 
m
h )] +
1
τθ+τpθ
(τθµθ + τpθp`i)− pi
γ¯
[(
1
τm+τqm+τpm+τxm
+ 1
τθ+τpθ
)
+ 1
τMn2
] ,
(A.4)
In (A.4) the first type of speculator who holds a diversified portfolio faces only the macro-
related noise trader risk at t = 2, the term 1/τMn2 . Similarly, for the second type speculator
k, his information set is {xθk, qi, pi} or {xθk, qi, p˘i, p`i} at t = 1, so his demand for the stock is
dk =
E[pi2|θi + θk, qi, p˘i, p`i]− pi
γ¯V ar[pi2|θi + θk, qi, p˘i, p`i]
=
1
τm+τqm+τpm
[τmµm + τqmqi + τpmp˘i] +
1
τθ+τpθ+τxθ
[
τθµθ + τpθp`i + τxθ
(
θi + 
θ
k
)]− pi
γ¯
[(
1
τm+τqm+τpm
+ 1
τθ+τpθ+τxθ
)
+ 1
τn2
] .
(A.5)
In (A.5), the second type of speculator cannot diversify away the macro-related noise trader
risk at t = 2 and thus face the total noise trader risk corresponding to 1/τn2.
The market clearing of the stock market at t = 1 implies
λ1
∫
dh + λ2
∫
dk + ni1 = 1. (A.6)
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Plugging (A.4) and (A.5) into (A.6) yields
1
τm+τqm+τpm+τxm
 τmµm + τqmqi
+τpm
(φ0−φ4µθ)+φ1pi+φ2qi
φ3
+ τxmmi
+ 1τθ+τpθ (τθµθ+τpθ (φ0−φ3µm)+φ1pi+φ2qiφ4 )−pi
γ1
+
1
τm+τqm+τpm
 τmµm + τqmqi
+τpm
(φ0−φ4µθ)+φ1pi+φ2qi
φ3
+ 1τθ+τpθ+τxθ [τθµθ+τpθ (φ0−φ3µm)+φ1pi+φ2qiφ4 +τxθθi]−pi
γ2

+n1i = 1,
(A.7)
where γ1 =
γ¯
λ1
[(
1
τm+τqm+τpm+τxm
+ 1
τθ+τpθ
)
+ 1
τMn2
]
and γ2 =
γ¯
λ2
[(
1
τm+τqm+τpm
+ 1
τθ+τpθ+τxθ
)
+ 1
τn2
]
.
Comparing the terms of (A.7) with those of (A.1), we obtain
φ3 =
1
γ1
τxm
τm+τqm+τpm+τxm
φ4 =
1
γ2
τxθ
τθ+τpθ+τxθ
φ1 = −

1
γ1
(
1
τm+τqm+τpm+τxm
τpm
φ1
φ3
+ 1
τθ+τpθ
τpθ
φ1
φ4
− 1
)
+ 1
γ2
(
1
τm+τqm+τpm
τpm
φ1
φ3
+ 1
τθ+τpθ+τxθ
τpθ
φ1
φ4
− 1
) 
φ2 = −

1
γ1
[
1
τm+τqm+τpm+τxm
(
τqm + τpm
φ2
φ3
)
+ 1
τθ+τpθ
τpθ
φ2
φ4
]
+ 1
γ2
[
1
τm+τqm+τpm
(
τqm + τpm
φ2
φ3
)
+ 1
τθ+τpθ+τxθ
τpθ
φ2
φ4
] 
. (A.8)
Plugging τpm =
1(
φ4
φ3
)2
1
τθ
+
(
1
φ3
)2
1
τn1
and τpθ =
1(
φ3
φ4
)2
1
τm
+
(
1
φ4
)2
1
τn1
into φ3 in (A.8) yields
φ3 =
τxm
τm+τqm+
1
(φ4φ3 )
2
1
τθ
+( 1φ3 )
2 1
τn1
+τxm
γ¯
λ1
 1
τm+τqm+
1
(φ4φ3 )
2
1
τθ
+( 1φ3 )
2 1
τn1
+τxm
+ 1
τθ+
1
(φ3φ4 )
2
1
τm
+( 1φ4 )
2 1
τn1
+ 1
τMn2
 . (A.9)
Similarly, plugging the expression of τpm and τpθ into φ4 in (A.8) yields
φ4 =
τxθ
τθ+
1
(φ3φ4 )
2
1
τm
+( 1φ4 )
2 1
τn
+τxθ
γ¯
λ2
 1
τm+τqm+
1
(φ4φ3 )
2
1
τθ
+( 1φ3 )
2 1
τn1
+ 1
τθ+
1
(φ3φ4 )
2
1
τm
+( 1φ4 )
2 1
τn1
+τxθ
+ ( 1
τMn2
+ 1
τFn2
) . (A.10)
The system of equations (A.9)-(A.10) solves the pair (φ3, φ4). After obtaining the solutions
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of φ3 and φ4, τpm and τpθ are known. Furthermore, (A.8) gives the solutions of φ1 and φ2:
φ1 =
1
γ1
+ 1
γ2
1 +
(
τpm
τxm
+ γ2
γ1
τθ+τpθ+τxθ
τθ+τpθ
τpθ
τxθ
)
+
(
τm+τqm+τpm+τxm
τm+τqm+τpm
τpm
τxm
γ1
γ2
+
τpθ
τxθ
) (A.11)
φ2 = −
1
γ1
τqm
τm+τqm+τpm+τxm
+ 1
γ2
τqm
τm+τqm+τpm
1 +
[
τpm
τxm
+ γ2
γ1
τθ+τpθ+τxθ
τθ+τpθ
τpθ
τxθ
]
+
[
γ1
γ2
τm+τqm+τpm+τxm
τm+τqm+τpm
τpm
τxm
+
τpθ
τxθ
] . (A.12)
To obtain the analytical properties of the solutions of φ1, φ2, φ3, φ4 as well as τpm and
τpθ, we proceed with our analysis in three steps.
First, we consider the extreme case that only the first type of speculator exists, not the
second type. This corresponds to λ2 = 0 and therefore γ2 =∞, φ4 = 0, τpθ = 0 and τpθφ4 = 0.
Hence, (A.9) can be transformed into a cubic function with respect to φ3, that is,
γ¯
λ1
(
1
τθ
+
1
τMn2
)
τn1φ
3
3 +
γ¯
λ1
[
1 +
(
1
τθ
+
1
τMn2
)
(τm + τqm + τxm)
]
φ3 − τxm = 0. (A.13)
(A.13) clearly has a unique positive solution with respect to φ3. In fact, if we write the
LHS of (A.13) as function Λ(φ3), it is easy to show that equation Λ(φ3) is monotonically
increasing in φ3 and Λ(φ3 = 0) < 0. Hence, equation Λ(φ3) = 0 has a unique positive
solution, around which ∂Λ
∂φ3
> 0. We also prove that this unique positive solution of φ3 is
increasing in λ1. In fact,
∂Λ
∂φ3
> 0 and ∂Λ
∂λ1
< 0, so by the implicit function theorem we have
dφ3
dλ1
= −
∂Λ
∂λ1
∂Λ
∂φ3
> 0. Similarly, the unique positive solution of φ3 is increasing in τ
M
n2 . In fact,
∂Λ
∂τMn2
< 0 and thus dφ3
dτMn2
= −
∂Λ
∂τMn2
∂Λ
∂φ3
> 0. Because τpm = φ
2
3τn1, τpm is increasing in λ1 and τ
M
n2 .
Moreover, plugging φ3 =
(
τpm
τn1
) 1
2
into (A.13), we have an equation with respect to τpm:
γ¯
λ1
(
1
τθ
+
1
τMn2
)
τn1
(
τpm
τn1
) 3
2
+
γ¯
λ1
[
1 +
(
1
τθ
+
1
τMn2
)
(τm + τqm + τxm)
](
τpm
τn1
) 1
2
− τxm = 0.
(A.14)
If we write the LHS of (A.14) as function Λ˜(τpm; τn1), it is easy to show that
∂Λ˜
∂τn1
< 0 and
∂Λ˜
∂τpm
> 0, so by the implicit function theorem we have ∂τpm
∂τn1
> 0. In short, we have the
following properties:
dφ3
dλ1
> 0,
dφ3
dτMn2
> 0,
dτpm
dλ1
> 0,
dτpm
dτMn2
> 0,
dτpm
dτn1
> 0. (A.15)
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When λ2 = 0, φ1 and φ2 in (A.11) and (A.12) can also be simplified as
φ1 =
1
γ1
τxm
τxm + τpm
φ2 = − 1
γ1
τqm
τm + τqm + τpm + τxm
τxm
τxm + τpm
.
Hence,
φ1
φ3
= 1 +
τm + τqm
τxm + τpm
(A.16)
φ2
φ3
= − τqm
τxm + τpm
. (A.17)
Second, we consider the other extreme case that only the second type of speculators
exists, not the first type. This corresponds to λ1 = 0 and therefore γ1 =∞, φ3 = 0, τpm = 0
and τpm
φ3
= 0. By symmetry, we can prove that φ4 is increasing in λ2 and τ
M
n2 and that τpθ is
increasing in λ2, τ
M
n2 and τn1. In short, we have the following properties:
dφ4
dλ2
> 0,
dφ4
dτMn2
> 0,
dτpθ
dλ2
> 0,
dτpθ
dτMn2
> 0,
dτpθ
dτn1
> 0. (A.18)
Third, the analysis on (A.8) is just the combination of the analyses on the two extreme
cases in steps 1 and 2. Because all functions are continuous, when λ2 is sufficiently close to
0, all of the properties in (A.15) for the case of λ2 = 0 remain. In addition, it is easy to
prove that when λ2 is sufficiently close to 0, the property
dτpθ
dλ2
> 0 holds.26
Let ω denote the ETF ownership of firm i (i.e., the proportion of firm i’s shares held by
ETFs). ETF ownership (ω) affects the price impact of macro-related noise trading (τMn1 and
τMn2 ) as well as the measure of different types of speculators (λ1 and λ2). Specifically,
∂τMn1
∂ω
> 0,
∂τMn2
∂ω
> 0,
∂λ1
∂ω
> 0,
∂λ2
∂ω
< 0.
Because the properties in (A.15) and the property
dτpθ
dλ2
> 0 hold when λ2 is small enough,
we conclude that under the sufficient condition that λ2 is small enough, τpm is increasing in
ω and τpθ is decreasing or slightly increasing in ω (Lemmas 2 and 3).
We can also endogenize λ1 and λ2 as a function of ω. Specifically, we study the ex
ante endogenous decision of information acquisition of speculators. First, we assume that
a speculator chooses to acquire information either about mi or about θi, that is, to acquire
26This is easy to prove. In fact, when λ2 = 0, τpθ = 0; when λ2 is slightly positive, τpθ is positive.
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either signal xmh or signal xθk.
27 So
λ1 + λ2 = 1. (A.19)
Second, it is reasonable to assume that the cost of acquiring signal xmh is higher than the cost
of acquiring signal xθk by c in terms of wealth, as acquiring the macro- or industry-related in-
formation helps investors to trade on more than one stock. So λ1 and λ2 are determined such
that the two types of speculators have the same ex ante utility (i.e., indifference condition).
As in Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), the indifference condition is
EV (W h)
EV (W k)
= 1, (A.20)
where EV (W h) ≡ E [U(W h)|qi, pi]. Hence, it follows that28
EV (W h)
EV (W k)
= eγ¯c
√
V ar[pi2|qi, pi, xmh]
V ar[pi2|qi, pi, xθk] = 1
⇐⇒ eγ¯c
√√√√√
(
1
τm+τqm+τpm+τxm
+ 1
τθ+τpθ
)
+ 1
τMn2(
1
τm+τqm+τpm
+ 1
τθ+τpθ+τxθ
)
+
(
1
τMn2
+ 1
τFn2
) = 1. (A.21)
Conditions (A.19) and (A.21) together solve λ1 and λ2. An increase in ω, causing an increase
in τMn2 , leads to a decrease in the LHS of (A.21),
29 so the equality is broken; to restore the
equality, λ1 needs to be increased to have an increase in τpm and a decrease in τpθ. That
is, λ1 is increasing in ω. Intuitively, an increase in ω, which lowers the macro-related noise
trader risk on the next date, causes the expected payoff for the first type of speculator to
increase by a higher proportion than the expected payoff for the second type of speculators,
so the second type has incentives to switch to being the first type.
27We assume that the information acquisition cost for either signal is sufficiently low so that a speculator
always chooses to acquire at least one signal.
28Note that the sign of U(Wh) or EV (Wh) is negative.
29An increase in ω also impacts on τMn1 and thereby τpm and τpθ. This channel may further make the
second type have incentives to switch to being the first type.
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Proof of Proposition 1: We have
K∗i = E [mi + θi|pi, qi, sθ, sm]
=

τm
τm+τqm+τpm+τsm
µm +
τpm
τm+τqm+τpm+τsm
(φ0−φ4µθ)+φ1pi+φ2qi
φ3
+ τqm
τm+τqm+τpm+τsm
qi +
τsm
τm+τqm+τpm+τsm
sm
+ τθ
τθ+τsθ+τpθ
µθ +
τpθ
τθ+τsθ+τpθ
(φ0−φ3µm)+φ1pi+φ2qi
φ4
+ τsθ
τθ+τsθ+τpθ
sθ

= κ0 +

[
τpm
τm+τqm+τpm+τsm
φ1
φ3
+
τpθ
τθ+τsθ+τpθ
φ1
φ4
]
pi +
[
τpm
τm+τqm+τpm+τsm
φ2
φ3
+ τqm
τm+τqm+τpm+τsm
+
τpθ
τθ+τsθ+τpθ
φ2
φ4
]
qi
+ τsm
τm+τqm+τpm+τsm
sm +
τsθ
τθ+τsθ+τpθ
sθ
 .
So we obtain κ1, κ2, κ3 and κ4 in (5). Under τsθ →∞, we have a cleaner result:
lim
τsθ→∞
κ1 =
τpm
τm + τqm + τpm + τsm
φ1
φ3
lim
τsθ→∞
κ2 =
τpm
τm + τqm + τpm + τsm
φ2
φ3
+
τqm
τm + τqm + τpm + τsm
lim
τsθ→∞
κ3 = 1.
By (A.16),
lim
τsθ→∞
κ1 =
τpm
τm + τqm + τpm + τsm
τm + τqm + τxm + τpm
τxm + τpm
, (A.22)
which is increasing in τpm under the sufficient condition that τxm > τsm, by noting that the
first-order derivative of (A.22) with respect to τpm is positive iff
(τm + τqm + τsm) (τxm + τpm + τm + τqm) (τxm + τpm)
(τm + τqm) (τm + τqm + τpm + τsm) τpm
> 1.
Therefore, by ∂τpm
∂ω
> 0 under the sufficient condition that λ2 is small enough, it follows
that ∂κ1
∂ω
> 0 under the sufficient condition that τsθ is high enough, λ2 is small enough, and
τxm > τsm.
Similarly, by (A.17),
lim
τsθ→∞
κ2 =
τqm
τm + τqm + τpm + τsm
τxm
τxm + τpm
which is decreasing in τpm. Therefore, it follows that
∂κ2
∂ω
< 0 under the sufficient condition
that τsθ is high enough and λ2 is small enough.
By (A.22), it follows that ∂κ1
∂τm
< 0 and ∂κ1
∂τqm
< 0 under the sufficient condition that
τxm > τsm, τsθ is high enough, and λ2 is small enough. Also, when τxm →∞, it follows that
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φ1
φ3
→ 1. Hence,
lim
τsθ→∞,τxm→∞
κ1 =
τpm
τm + τqm + τpm + τsm
,
which implies ∂
2κ1
∂τpm∂τqm
< 0 and ∂
2κ1
∂τpm∂τm
when τpm < τm + τqm + τsm. Therefore, when τqm
is sufficiently high such that τpm < τm + τqm + τsm, it follows that
∂2κ1
∂τpm∂τqm
< 0 and thus
∂2κ1
∂ω∂τqm
< 0 under the sufficient condition that τsθ and τxm are high enough and λ2 is small
enough. Similarly, when τm is not too low such that τpm < τm + τqm + τsm, it follows that
∂2κ1
∂τpm∂τm
< 0 and thus ∂
2κ1
∂ω∂τm
< 0 under the sufficient condition that τsθ and τxm are high
enough and λ2 is small enough.
Proof of Proposition 2: By exploiting the law of iterated expectations, we obtain
Π(τpm, τqm, τsm, τsθ, τpθ) = E
(
(mi + θi)E [mi + θi|I]− 1
2
(E [mi + θi|I])2
)
= E
[
E
(
(mi + θi)E [mi + θi|I]− 1
2
(E [mi + θi|I])2
)
|I
]
=
1
2
E
[
(E [mi + θi|I])2
]
.
Then
1
2
E
[
(E [mi + θi|I])2
]
=
1
2
E
{ τmτm+τqm+τpm+τsmµm + τpmτm+τqm+τpm+τsm p˘i + τqmτm+τqm+τpm+τsm qi + τsmτm+τqm+τpm+τsm sm
+ τθ
τθ+τsθ+τpθ
µθ +
τpθ
τθ+τsθ+τpθ
p`i +
τsθ
τθ+τsθ+τpθ
sθ
}2
=
1
2
[
(µm + µθ)
2 +
(
1
τm
− 1
τm + τqm + τpm + τsm
)
+
(
1
τθ
− 1
τθ + τsθ + τpθ
)]
.
44
  
 
B   Definition of the Variables 
CAPXRND: The sum of capital expenditures and R&D expenses at the end of fiscal year 
divided by beginning-of-year total assets. 
CAPX: Capital expenditures at the end of fiscal year dividend by beginning-of-year total 
assets. 
RND: R&D expenses at the end of fiscal year divided by beginning-of-year total assets. 
Missing value was set to zero. 
Q: Market value of equity plus book value of assets minus book value of equity at the end 
of fiscal year scaled by beginning-of-year total assets. The book value of equity follows 
the definition of Fama and French (1992). 
PQ: For each firm, PQ is the average Tobin’s Q of its product market peers. We use the 
Text-based Network Industry Classification (TNIC) to identify peer firm. Hoberg and 
Phillips (2010, 2016) develop this data through a textual analysis of business descriptions 
of firms' 10-K filings.  
ETF: Firm ownership by US equity ETFs at the end of fiscal year. 
INST: Institutional ownership of firm at the end of fiscal year. Institutional ownership is 
defined as the sum of shares held by institutions from 13F filings at the end of fiscal year 
divided by total shares outstanding.  
INSTR: The orthogonalized institutional ownership with respect to ETF ownership 
through the following yearly cross-sectional regressions:  INSTit= α0 + β1 ETFit+ INSTRit . 
IndMFOR: Ownership of firm by index mutual funds at the end of fiscal year, and is 
orthogonalized with respect to ETF ownership. Index funds are identified using CRSP 
Mutual Fund database index fund dummy, and by identifying fund names containing 
“index,” “S&P,” “Russell,” NASDAQ,” and “Dow Jones.” 
ActMFOR: Ownership of firm by active (non-index) mutual funds at the end of fiscal year, 
and is the orthogonalized with respect to ETF ownership. 
HFO: Ownership of firm by hedge funds at the end of fiscal year.  
CF: Net income before extraordinary items plus depreciation and amortization expenses 
at the end of fiscal year divided by beginning-of-year total assets. 
RET it+3: Three-year cumulative monthly return of firm i starting from January of year t+1. 
SIZE: Natural logarithm of firm’s market capitalization at the end of fiscal year. 
SG: Annual growth rate of sales revenue at firm level. 
CASH: The ratio of cash and cash equivalent at the end of fiscal year to beginning-of-year 
total assets. 
LEV: The sum of long-term liability and current liability at the end of fiscal year scaled by 
beginning-of-year total assets.  
ROA: Operating income before depreciation (oibdp) at the end of fiscal year scaled by 
beginning-of-year total assets. 
  
 
1/ASSET: The reciprocal of total assets at the end of fiscal year. 
Beta: Market beta of an individual stock within fiscal year is estimated by running a time-
series regression of the daily stock return on contemporaneous and four lags of market 
return over the prior 12 months, with a minimum of 120 daily observations. Market beta is 
the summation of the five coefficients in front of contemporaneous and lagged market 
return.  
ISGVOL: The standard deviation of the annual industry-level sales growth over a past 20-
year window. Industry-level sales growth is measured by the percentage change of the 
aggregated sales of all firms within the same two-digit standard industrial classification 
(SIC) code. 
InsiderProfit: Average profitability of insiders’ trades over the year. Trade profitability is 
equal to the one-month market-adjusted return in absolute value following the net 
transaction by the insider. Insider trades include any open market stock transaction initiated 
by the top five executives of a firm, obtained from Thomson Reuters Insider Filing database.  
ETFRET: Annual average return of top-five ETFs (in terms of ownership of this stock) 
holding the stock.   
Earn_Sys: Systematic components of annually-adjusted earnings innovation (EARNit). For 
each stock, it is calculated as the fitted value from the regression bellow: 
EARNit= α0 + β1 MKTEARNt+ β2 INDEARNit + εit, 
where EARNit is the annually change in earnings per share excluding extraordinary items 
(EPSPX) of firm i at the end of fiscal year t scaled by the stock price at the end of fiscal 
year t-1 (PRCC_f), MKTEARNt and INDEARNit  are the weighted averages of annually-
adjusted earnings innovation of all firms traded on NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ and firms 
with the same two-digit SIC code as firm i, respectively. 
Earn_Firm: Firm-specific components of the annually-adjusted earnings innovation at the 
end of fiscal year (EARNit). It is calculated for each stock as the residual value from the 
regression bellow: 
EARNit= α0 + β1 MKTEARNit+ β2 INDEARNit + εit. 
Gindex: G-index is constructed by adding one index point for each of the 24 
(anti-)governance provisions listed in Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003). Higher index 
values imply weaker governance.  
Eindex: The E-index consists of six of the 24 provisions listed in Gompers, Ishii, and 
Metrick (2003). Higher index value implies weaker governance.  
∆Accuracy: The change in the median value of analyst forecast error (Accuracy) for each 
firm-year. Forecast error is defined as the absolute difference between forecasted earnings 
and actual earnings dividend by the actual earnings.  
PAccuracy: Percentage change in Accuracy for each firm-year, defined as ∆Accuracy it-1 
divided by Accuracy it-2. 
  
 
DelayCon: Text-based measure of financing constraint following Hoberg and Maksimovic 
(2015).  (Higher score indicates more constrained) 
EquityDelayCon: Text-based measure of financing constraint in the equity market 
following Hoberg and Maksimovic (2015). 
DebtDelayCon: Text-based measure of financing constraint in the debt market following 
Hoberg and Maksimovic (2015).  
∆CDS: Annual change of Credit Default Spread for each firm-year.  
Issurance: Net equity issuance divided by beginning-of-year total assets.  
Loss: Dummy variable that equals one if EARNit is negative, and zero otherwise. 
Earnvol: Standard deviation of earnings per share excluding extraordinary items over the 
past 10 years.  
TURN: Turnover is the average daily trading volume over shares outstanding within each 
fiscal year. Since the nature of dealers in the NASDAQ makes difficult to compare its 
turnover with the turnover observed in the NYSE and AMEX, we follow Gao and Ritter 
(2010) to adjust the trading volume for NASDAQ stocks. 
SYNCH: For each firm-year observation, we regress daily returns on the value-weighted 
market return and the value-weighted two-digit SIC industry return, with a minimum of 
120 daily observations, as follows:  
RET it= α0 + β1 MKTRETit+ β2 MKTRETit-1 + β3 INDRETjt+ β4 INDRETjt-1 + εit 
Following the definition in Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000), we define synchronicity as 
       SYNCH it=log (R
2/(1- R2)) 
where R2 is the coefficient of determination estimated from the above equation. Negative 
adjusted R2 numbers are trimmed at 0.0001. The log transformation of R2 creates an 
unbounded continuous variable out of a variable originally bounded by zero and one. 
BETAVOL: Dummy variable that equals one if the standard deviation of Beta (standard 
deviation measured over a past 3-year window) is above the median level for the entire 
sample, and zero otherwise. 
NPR: Following Lakonishok and Lee (2001), NPR is calculated as the number of 
purchases minus the number of sells in the past six months, scaled by the total number of 
transactions. NPR is bounded between -1 and 1. A higher NPR indicates stronger intensity 
of insider purchases relative to insider sells.  
Ret(-1): Past one-month stock return 
LogBM: Natural logarithm of firm’s book value of equity over market value of equity 
MOM: Cumulative returns in the previous 12 months. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Time Series of Average ETF Ownership 
This figure plots the average fraction of shares outstanding held by ETFs for firms in our sample 
from year 2000 to 2013. The vertical axis represents the average ETF ownership and the horizontal 
axis represents the year.  The calculation of ETF ownership is described in Section 4.1. 
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Figure 2: ETF Ownership around the Russell 1000 Cutoff 
This figure plots the average ETF ownership for stocks within a bandwidth of 200 around the 
Russell 1000 threshold in our sample period where the vertical line denotes the 1000th cutoff.  The 
horizontal axis indicates the distance of a firm’s ranking to the 1000th cutoff determined by its end-
of-May market capitalization from CRSP. The vertical axis represents the average ETF ownership 
calculated as of one quarter after the June index reconstitution and in bins of five stocks.  
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics  
This table reports the summary statistics for all variables used in this paper. The sample period is from 
2003 to 2013. Variable definitions are in the Appendix B.  
 
Variables N Mean S.D. Min P25 Median P75 Max 
CAPXRNDit  28362 0.108 0.117 0.001 0.034 0.071 0.137 0.653 
CAPXit 28362 0.053 0.064 0.000 0.015 0.032 0.064 0.382 
RNDit 28405 0.054 0.103 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.067 0.595 
Q it-1 28405 1.912 1.302 0.593 1.109 1.481 2.200 7.969 
PQ jt-1 27391 2.030 0.779 0.931 1.439 1.839 2.440 4.167 
ETF it-1 28405 0.027 0.026 0.000 0.007 0.021 0.041 0.107 
ETFRET it-1 25375 0.095 0.180 -0.386 0.006 0.096 0.191 0.531 
ETF(IV150) it-1 394 0.033 0.010 -0.010 0.028 0.033 0.039 0.070 
ETF(IV200) it-1 629 0.034 0.010 -0.010 0.029 0.033 0.039 0.067 
ROA it+1 26232 0.079 0.209 -0.941 0.046 0.113 0.177 0.477 
SGit+1 25909 0.089 0.306 -0.677 -0.034 0.061 0.167 1.835 
AvgROA it+3 20597 0.083 0.193 -0.878 0.054 0.114 0.173 0.454 
AvgSG it+3 20276 0.097 0.236 -0.313 -0.008 0.059 0.145 1.606 
INST it-1 28405 0.580 0.313 0.000 0.318 0.638 0.839 1.000 
INSTR it-1 28405 0.004 0.223 -2.003 -0.128 0.000 0.145 5.556 
CF it 28382 0.035 0.194 -0.849 0.013 0.077 0.131 0.380 
SIZE it-1 28405 6.163 2.001 1.934 4.749 6.139 7.500 11.164 
RET it+3 28307 0.089 0.888 -2.945 -0.298 0.131 0.539 2.627 
SG it-1 26956 0.136 0.378 -0.629 -0.018 0.080 0.202 2.491 
CASHit-1 28403 0.215 0.230 0.001 0.038 0.127 0.318 0.936 
LEV it-1 28405 0.183 0.181 0.000 0.004 0.146 0.306 0.695 
ROA it-1 27236 0.091 0.194 -0.826 0.050 0.115 0.183 0.523 
1/ASSET it-1 28405 0.011 0.022 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.010 0.131 
RET it 28368 0.115 0.551 -0.853 -0.222 0.058 0.342 2.463 
TURNit 28331 0.112 0.117 0.000 0.046 0.085 0.143 4.541 
SYNCHit 28163 -2.420 2.607 -9.210 -4.206 -1.467 -0.493 1.476 
Earn_Sysit  24549 0.012 0.115 -0.425 -0.011 0.005 0.024 0.587 
Earn_Firmit 24549 -0.003 0.097 -0.410 -0.021 0.000 0.016 0.406 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Table 2: ETF Ownership and Investment-q Sensitivity 
This table presents the results from regression of firm investments (CAPXRNDit, CAPXit and RNDit) on 
the interaction of Tobin’s Q and ETF ownership (Q it-1× ETF it-1). Both firm- and year-fixed effects are 
included. T-statistics, reported in parentheses, are based on standard errors clustered at the firm level. *, **, 
and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% two-tailed levels, respectively. See Appendix B 
for definitions of other variables.  
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑄𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑄𝑖𝑡−1 × 𝐸𝑇𝐹𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐸𝑇𝐹𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡         (7) 
 CAPXRNDit CAPXit RNDit 
Q it-1× ETF it-1 0.105*** 
(3.92) 
0.041*** 
(2.70) 
0.058*** 
(3.15) 
Q it-1 0.034*** 
(9.09) 
0.008*** 
(3.57) 
0.025*** 
(9.05) 
ETF it-1 -0.289*** 
(-4.88) 
-0.070* 
(-1.84) 
-0.212*** 
(-5.46) 
INSTR it-1 -0.010 
(-1.57) 
-0.005 
(-1.24) 
-0.007 
(-1.62) 
INSTR it-1×Q it-1 0.004 
(1.14) 
0.004** 
(2.18) 
0.000 
(0.19) 
CF it -0.052*** 
(-5.28) 
0.027*** 
(6.92) 
-0.078*** 
(-9.37) 
CF it ×ETF it-1 0.606*** 
(2.69) 
0.045 
(0.44) 
0.546*** 
(3.03) 
SIZE it-1 -0.007*** 
(-4.72) 
0.002* 
(1.84) 
-0.008*** 
(-7.82) 
SIZE it-1×Q it-1 -0.003*** 
(-5.02) 
-0.000 
(-1.18) 
-0.002*** 
(-6.30) 
RET it+3 -0.004*** 
(-4.57) 
-0.001*** 
(-2.93) 
-0.002*** 
(-4.60) 
SG it-1 0.003 
(1.49) 
0.001 
(1.56) 
0.002 
(1.14) 
CASHit-1 0.001 
(0.14) 
0.007* 
(1.84) 
-0.006 
(-1.15) 
LEV it-1 -0.077*** 
(-11.28) 
-0.044*** 
(-10.88) 
-0.027*** 
(-5.39) 
ROA it-1 0.003 
(0.33) 
0.025*** 
(6.18) 
-0.024*** 
(-4.05) 
1/ASSET it-1 0.770*** 
(6.16) 
0.309*** 
(5.14) 
0.483*** 
(4.74) 
Adjusted R2 0.790 0.711 0.898 
Fixed Effect Y, F Y, F Y, F 
N. of Obs. 26270 26270 26270 
 
 
  
 
Table 3: ETF Ownership and Investment-q Sensitivity: Controlling for ETF-level 
Returns 
This table presents the results from regression of firm investments (CAPXRNDit, CAPXit and RNDit) on 
the interaction of Tobin’s Q and ETF ownership, controlling for the annual return of top-five ETFs 
holding the stock (ETFRETit-1), stock’s market beta (BETA it-1) and their interaction term (ETFRET it-
1*BETA it-1). Both firm- and year-fixed effects are included. T-statistics, reported in parentheses, are based 
on standard errors clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
two-tailed levels, respectively. See Appendix B for definitions of other variables.  
 CAPXRNDit CAPXit RNDit 
Q it-1×ETFit-1 0.101*** 
(3.73) 
0.032** 
(2.14) 
0.060*** 
(3.12) 
Q it-1 0.040*** 
(9.68) 
0.010*** 
(4.61) 
0.028*** 
(8.43) 
ETF it-1 -0.252*** 
(-4.22) 
-0.031 
(-0.83) 
-0.210*** 
(-5.04) 
ETFRET it-1×BETA it-1 0.003 
(1.13) 
0.004*** 
(2.58) 
-0.002 
(-1.22) 
ETFRETit-1 -0.002 
(-0.44) 
-0.003 
(-1.10) 
0.002 
(0.78) 
BETA it-1 -0.004*** 
(-4.35) 
-0.003*** 
(-4.76) 
-0.001* 
(-1.78) 
INSTR it-1 -0.015** 
(-2.23) 
-0.005 
(-1.24) 
-0.011** 
(-2.51) 
INSTR it-1×Q it-1 0.007** 
(2.15) 
0.004** 
(2.08) 
0.004* 
(1.72) 
CF it -0.058*** 
(-4.97) 
0.031*** 
(6.55) 
-0.089*** 
(-9.04) 
CF it ×ETF it-1 0.716*** 
(2.90) 
0.008 
(0.08) 
0.710*** 
(3.55) 
SIZE it-1 -0.008*** 
(-4.99) 
0.002* 
(1.67) 
-0.008*** 
(-7.45) 
SIZE it-1×Q it-1 -0.003*** 
(-6.26) 
-0.001** 
(-2.16) 
-0.002*** 
(-6.08) 
RET it+3 -0.004*** 
(-4.84) 
-0.002*** 
(-3.01) 
-0.003*** 
(-5.11) 
SG it-1 0.003 
(1.40) 
-0.000 
(-0.22) 
0.003* 
(1.65) 
CASHit-1 -0.002 
(-0.25) 
0.004 
(1.05) 
-0.006 
(-0.95) 
LEV it-1 -0.074*** 
(-10.24) 
-0.039*** 
(-9.65) 
-0.028*** 
(-5.36) 
ROA it-1 0.004 
(0.44) 
0.029*** 
(6.40) 
-0.027*** 
(-3.86) 
1/ASSET it-1 1.084*** 
(5.53) 
0.307*** 
(4.64) 
0.789*** 
(4.81) 
Adjusted R2 0.802 0.736 0.902 
Fixed Effect Y, F Y, F Y, F 
N. of Obs. 22676 22676 22676 
 
  
 
Table 4: Future Earnings-Return Relation 
This table presents the results from regression of firms’ earnings on the interaction of past stock return 
and ETF ownership (RET it-1×ETFit-1), and the interaction of past ETF-level return (top five) and market 
beta (ETFRET it-1*BETA it-1). In columns (2) and (3), we decompose earnings into systematic earnings 
and firm-specific earnings. Both firm- and year-fixed effects are included. T-statistics, reported in 
parentheses, are based on standard errors clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** indicate significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% two-tailed levels, respectively. See Appendix B for definitions of other variables.  
 Earnit Earn_Sysit Earn_Firmit 
RET it-1×ETFit-1 0.758*** 
(3.52) 
0.509*** 
(2.70) 
0.280 
(1.26) 
RET it-1 -0.007 
(-0.81) 
-0.013* 
(-1.69) 
0.005 
(0.53) 
ETF it-1 -1.509*** 
(-5.92) 
-1.035*** 
(-4.42) 
-0.465** 
(-2.15) 
ETFRET it-1×BETA it-1 0.038*** 
(2.62) 
0.036*** 
(2.97) 
-0.009 
(-0.57) 
ETFRETit-1 -0.093*** 
(-4.10) 
-0.066*** 
(-3.86) 
-0.018 
(-0.85) 
BETA it-1 0.030*** 
(6.06) 
0.019*** 
(4.25) 
0.015*** 
(3.45) 
SIZE it-1 0.017** 
(2.04) 
0.002 
(0.21) 
0.016** 
(2.09) 
LEV it-1 0.015 
(0.43) 
0.032 
(1.12) 
0.001 
(0.04) 
ROA it-1 0.346*** 
(9.06) 
0.232*** 
(6.89) 
0.110*** 
(3.24) 
MB it-1 0.000 
(1.16) 
0.000** 
(1.96) 
-0.000 
(-1.16) 
 
Adjusted R2 0.142 0.272 0.003 
Fixed Effect Y, F Y, F Y, F 
N. of Obs. 19526 19526 19526 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Table 5: Quasi-Natural Experiment Based on Russell Index Reconstitution 
Panel A: First-stage IV regression 
This panel reports results from first-stage regression of ETF ownership (ETFit ) and its interaction with 
Tobin’s Q (Qit×ETFit ) on an indicator of membership in the Russell 2000 index (Incl 2000) and its 
interaction with Tobin’s Q (Incl 2000it *Qit) within a bandwidth of 150, 200 and 250 around the 1000th 
cutoff. 𝐿𝑛(𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡) is the natural logarithm of end-of-May market capitalization from CRSP of stock 
𝑖 in year 𝑡. 𝐿𝑛(𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑡) is the natural logarithm of end-of-June float-adjusted market capitalization of 
stock 𝑖 in year 𝑡 and 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 are standard controls in our baseline equation (7). Firm-fixed effects are 
included. T-statistics, reported in parentheses, are based on standard errors clustered at the firm level. *, **, 
and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% two-tailed levels, respectively.  
 
  (-150，150) (-200，200) (-250，250) 
 ETFit Qit×ETFit ETFit Qit×ETFit ETFit Qit×ETFit 
Incl 2000it 0.0072*** -0.0105 0.0072*** -0.0119 0.0080*** -0.0086 
 (2.76) (-1.02) (3.24) (-1.16) (3.85) (-0.90) 
Incl 2000it ×Qit -0.0001 0.0139** 0.0001 0.0141** -0.0000 0.0129** 
 (-0.15) (2.05) (0.16) (2.17) (-0.03) (2.04) 
Ln(Mktcapit) 0.1698 0.0370 0.0366 -0.2105 -0.0595 -0.2515* 
 (1.17) (0.12) (0.40) (-0.94) (-0.71) (-1.67) 
Ln(Mktcapit)^2 -0.0133 -0.0046 -0.0043 0.0111 0.0025 0.0144 
 (-1.38) (-0.22) (-0.70) (0.76) (0.45) (1.45) 
Ln(Float)it 0.0237*** 0.0328*** 0.0240*** 0.0352*** 0.0216*** 0.0318*** 
 (9.55) (8.38) (10.86) (10.41) (10.83) (11.28) 
ETFRET it×BETA it 0.0080** 0.0049 0.0053** 0.0034 0.0065*** 0.0033 
 (2.19) (0.79) (2.08) (0.70) (3.23) (0.75) 
ETFRETit -0.0171 -0.0177 -0.0078 -0.0122 -0.0099 -0.0083 
 (-1.35) (-0.77) (-0.85) (-0.62) (-1.19) (-0.50) 
BETA it -0.0018** -0.0030** -0.0009 -0.0022* -0.0014** -0.0030** 
 (-2.13) (-2.05) (-1.26) (-1.76) (-2.45) (-2.97) 
       
Controls Include Include Include Include Include Include 
F test 9.94 12.22 12.96 15.68 17.68 25.05 
Adjusted R2 0.835 0.760 0.835 0.756 0.831 0.762 
Fixed Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N. of Obs. 603 603 847 847 1089 1089 
 
 
  
  
 
Panel B: Second-stage IV regression 
This panel reports results of the second-stage regression of investments (CAPX plus R&D expenses) on 
the predicted ETF ownership (ETF(IV)it-1) and the predicted interaction of ETF ownership with Tobin’s 
Q (Qit-1×ETFit-1 (IV)). Both firm-fixed and year-fixed effects are included. T-statistics, reported in 
parentheses, are based on standard errors clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** indicate significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% two-tailed levels, respectively.  
 
  (-150, +150) (-200, +200) (-250, +250) 
Q it-1× ETF it-1 (IV) 
1.001** 0.826** 0.548* 
(2.32) (2.50) (1.76) 
Q it-1 
-0.243 -0.212 -0.025 
(-1.38) (-1.45) (-0.23) 
ETF(IV) it-1 
-2.905** -2.512** -1.585** 
(-2.23) (-2.52) (-2.03) 
ETFRET it-1*BETA it-1 
0.002 0.024* 0.016 
(0.11) (1.89) (1.58) 
ETFRET it-1 
-0.018 -0.041 -0.042 
(-0.53) (-1.15) (-1.56) 
BETA it-1 
-0.005 -0.009** -0.006** 
(-1.01) (-2.27) (-2.06) 
    
Ln(Mktcapit-1) Included Included Included 
Ln(Mktcapit-1)^2 Included Included Included 
Ln(Floatit-1) Included Included Included 
Controls Included Included Included 
Adjusted R2 0.856 0.858 0.858 
Fixed Effect Y, F Y, F Y, F 
N. of Obs. 394 629 860 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
Table 6: ETF Ownership and Investment Sensitivity to Peers’ Prices 
This table presents the results from the regression that adds firm peers’ average Tobin’s Q and its 
interaction with firm’s own ETF ownership (PQ it-1× ETF it-1) into our baseline equation (8).  Both firm- 
and year-fixed effects are included. T-statistics, reported in parentheses, are based on standard errors 
clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% two-tailed levels, 
respectively. See Appendix B for definitions of other variables. 
 
 CAPXRNDit CAPXit RNDit 
Q it-1× ETF it-1 0.145*** 
(4.91) 
0.055*** 
(3.22) 
0.080*** 
(3.90) 
PQ it-1× ETF it-1 -0.149*** 
(-4.04) 
-0.075*** 
(-3.48) 
-0.066** 
(-2.46) 
Q it-1 0.041*** 
(9.87) 
0.010*** 
(4.52) 
0.028*** 
(8.64) 
PQ it-1 0.005*** 
(3.28) 
0.004*** 
(4.01) 
0.001 
(0.85) 
ETF it-1 -0.042 
(-0.54) 
0.076 
(1.56) 
-0.119** 
(-2.23) 
ETFRETit-1×BETA it-1 0.003 
(1.17) 
0.004** 
(2.48) 
-0.002 
(-1.14) 
ETFRETit-1 -0.001 
(-0.22) 
-0.002 
(-0.83) 
0.002 
(0.97) 
BETA it-1 -0.005*** 
(-4.60) 
-0.003*** 
(-5.04) 
-0.001* 
(-1.92) 
INSTR it-1 -0.014* 
(-1.91) 
-0.004 
(-0.98) 
-0.010** 
(-2.22) 
INSTR it-1×Q it-1 0.007* 
(1.89) 
0.004* 
(1.85) 
0.004 
(1.49) 
CF it -0.057*** 
(-4.81) 
0.032*** 
(6.54) 
-0.089*** 
(-8.95) 
CF it ×ETF it-1 0.591** 
(2.42) 
-0.060 
(-0.53) 
0.673*** 
(3.40) 
    
Controls Included Included Included 
Adjusted R2 0.802 0.737 0.901 
Fixed Effect Y, F Y, F Y, F 
N. of Obs. 21985 21985 21985 
 
  
  
 
Table 7: Cross-Sectional Heterogeneity Tests 
This table reports the results from the baseline regression (8) of firm investments (CAPXRNDit) on the 
interaction of Tobin’s Q and ETF ownership (Q it-1× ETF it-1) conditional on the importance of 
systematic information to firms (column (1)), the uncertainty of systematic information (column 
(2)) and the precision of managerial firm-specific information (column (3)), respectively. The 
importance of systematic information is measured by stocks’ market beta (Beta). The uncertainty of 
systematic information is measured by the sales growth volatility at industry level (ISGVOL), 
defined as the standard deviation of the industry sales growth over a past 20-year window. Industry 
sales growth is measured by the percentage change of aggregated sales of firms with the same two-digit 
standard industrial classification (SIC) code. Managerial firm-specific information is measured by 
the average profitability of insider trading (InsiderProfit) in each firm-year. For all three portioning 
variables, we create a dummy equal to one if its value is above sample median in year t-1.  Both firm- 
and year-fixed effects are included. T-statistics, reported in parentheses, are based on standard errors 
clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% two-tailed levels, 
respectively. See Appendix B for definitions of other variables. 
 
 
 Importance of 
systematic information 
Uncertainty of  
systematic 
information 
Managerial firm-
specific 
information 
 (1) (2) (3) 
  Beta ISGVOL InsiderProfit 
Q it-1× ETF it-1 ×Dum it-1 0.081** 0.217** 0.049 
 (2.13) (2.44) (1.44) 
Q it-1× ETF it-1 0.046 0.074*** 0.076** 
 (1.60) (2.84) (2.56) 
Q it-1×Dum it-1 0.000 0.008* -0.001 
 (-0.12) (1.80) (-0.51) 
ETF it-1×Dum it-1 -0.115* -0.218* -0.067 
 (-1.77) (-1.70) (-1.08) 
Q it-1 0.001 -0.021*** 0.001 
 (0.20) (-2.86) (0.47) 
ETF it-1 0.037*** 0.035*** 0.037*** 
 (8.76) (8.72) (8.84) 
Dum it-1 -0.141** -0.189*** -0.187*** 
 (-2.28) (-3.12) (-2.95) 
ETFRETit-1×BETA it-1 0.003 0.003 0.001 
 (1.22) (1.34) (0.48) 
ETFRET it-1 -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 
 (-0.55) (-0.66) (-0.23) 
BETA it-1 -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
 (-4.55) (-4.42) (-4.26) 
    
Controls Included Included Included 
Adjusted R2 0.804 0.805 0.803 
Fixed Effect Y, F Y, F Y, F 
N. of Obs. 22654 22663 20134 
 
 
  
  
 
Table 8: ETF Ownership and Future Operating Performance 
This table reports the results from the regression of firm’s ex-post operating performance in year t+1 
(ROAit+1, SGit+1) and their three-year averages (AvgROAit+3, AvgSGit+3) on ETF ownership (ETF it-1). 
ROA is measured as operating income before depreciation scaled by the beginning-of- year total assets. SG 
is the annual growth rate in sales. The control variables include firm size (SIZE it-1), book leverage ratio 
(LEV it-1), market-to-book ratio (MB it-1), cash holdings (CASH it-1) and institutional ownership (INSR it-1). 
Both firm- and year-fixed effects are included. T-statistics, reported in parentheses, are based on robust 
standard errors clustered at the firm level.  
 
 ROAit+1 AvgROAit+3 SGit+1 AvgSGit+3 
ETF it-1 0.124 
(1.47) 
0.209** 
(2.50) 
0.533*** 
(3.09) 
0.477*** 
(2.82) 
SIZE it-1 0.003 
(1.18) 
-0.015*** 
(-6.67) 
-0.083*** 
(-15.96) 
-0.085*** 
(-15.40) 
MB it-1 0.003*** 
(5.20) 
0.003*** 
(5.38) 
0.009*** 
(6.30) 
0.006*** 
(5.53) 
LEV it-1 -0.030** 
(-2.41) 
0.001 
(0.07) 
-0.205*** 
(-6.89) 
-0.170*** 
(-5.36) 
CASH it-1 -0.077*** 
(-5.60) 
-0.005 
(-0.35) 
0.390*** 
(11.74) 
0.309*** 
(10.25) 
INSTR it-1 0.009 
(1.18) 
0.012* 
(1.77) 
0.042** 
(2.44) 
0.030** 
(1.98) 
 
Adjusted R2 0.789 0.841 0.180 0.508 
Fixed Effect Y,F Y,F Y,F Y,F 
N. of Obs. 25671 20191 25343 19861 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
Table 9: Alternative Explanation I: Improvement in Corporate Governance 
This table reports the results from our baseline regression (8) of firm investments (CAPXRNDit) on the 
interaction of Tobin’s Q and ETF ownership (Q it-1× ETF it-1) conditional on corporate governance 
quality measured by G-index and E-index in Panel A and on changes in corporate governance quality 
measured by ∆Gindex it-1 and ∆Eindex it-1 in Panel B. Both firm- and year-fixed effects are included. T-
statistics, reported in parentheses, are based on standard errors clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% two-tailed levels, respectively. See Appendix B for 
definitions of other variables.   
 
Panel A: Dependent variable= CAPXRNDit 
 G-index (Gindex it-2)  E-index (Eindex it-2) 
 Strong 
(1) 
Neutral 
(2) 
Weak 
(3) 
 Strong 
(1) 
Neutral 
(2) 
Weak 
(3) 
Q it-1× ETF it-1 0.423** 
(2.06) 
0.201** 
(2.01) 
-0.444 
(-1.02) 
 0.505*** 
(3.55) 
0.180* 
(1.80) 
0.063 
(0.17) 
Q it-1 0.005 
(0.24) 
0.061*** 
(5.98) 
-0.012 
(-0.28) 
 0.018 
(0.93) 
0.062*** 
(6.19) 
-0.008 
(-0.11) 
ETF it-1 -0.185 
(-0.37) 
-0.126 
(-0.84) 
0.679 
(1.12) 
 -0.318 
(-0.68) 
-0.073 
(-0.49) 
-0.135 
(-0.23) 
Controls Included Included Included  Included Included Included 
Adjusted R2 0.843 0.801 0.775  0.832 0.803 0.768 
Fixed Effect Y, F Y, F Y, F  Y, F Y, F Y, F 
N. of Obs. 368 5826 315  346 5919 229 
Qit-1×ETFit-1: 
(1)=(3) 
  0.57    0.86 
 
Panel B: Dependent variable= CAPXRNDit 
 G-index (∆Gindex it-1)  E-index (∆Eindex it-1) 
 Full sample 
 
 
(1) 
Sample without 
enhanced 
governance 
 (2) 
 Full sample 
 
 
(1) 
Sample without 
enhanced 
Governance 
 (2) 
Q it-1× ETF it-1 0.186* 
(1.88) 
0.177* 
(1.74) 
 0.186* 
(1.88) 
0.182* 
(1.79) 
Q it-1 0.058*** 
(6.19) 
0.059*** 
(6.25) 
 0.058*** 
(6.19) 
0.058*** 
(6.27) 
ETF it-1 -0.065 
(-0.39) 
-0.037 
(-0.22) 
 -0.065 
(-0.39) 
-0.047 
(-0.27) 
Controls Included Included  Included Included 
Adjusted R2 0.803 0.802  0.803 0.803 
Fixed Effect Y, F Y, F  Y, F Y, F 
N. of Obs. 5055 4831  5055 4886 
Qit-1×ETFit-1: 
(1)=(2) 
 0.99   0.95 
Note: We do not separately examine the subsample with enhanced governance because of its extremely 
small sample size.  
  
  
 
Table 10: Alternative Explanation II: Change in Information Environment 
This table reports the results from our baseline regression (8) of firm investments (CAPXRNDit) on the 
interaction of Tobin’s Q and ETF ownership (Q it-1× ETF it-1) conditional on the change in firm’s 
information environment measured by the absolute and percentage change in consensus analyst forecast 
accuracy at the fiscal year end of t-1 (∆Accuracy it-1 and ∆PAccuracy it-1). Both firm- and year-fixed 
effects are included. T-statistics, reported in parentheses, are based on standard errors clustered at the firm 
level. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% two-tailed levels, respectively. See 
Appendix B for definitions of other variables.  
 
Dependent variable= CAPXRNDit 
 Absolute improvement in forecast 
accuracy (∆Accuracy it-1) 
 Percentage improvement in forecast 
accuracy (∆PAccuracy it-1) 
 High 
(1) 
Low 
(2) 
 High 
(1) 
Low 
(2) 
Q it-1× ETF it-1 0.089** 
(2.26) 
0.082** 
(1.99) 
 0.067* 
(1.71) 
0.107*** 
(2.61) 
Q it-1 0.046*** 
(7.54) 
0.038*** 
(6.03) 
 0.049*** 
(7.44) 
0.049*** 
(7.69) 
ETF it-1 -0.303*** 
(-3.43) 
-0.044 
(-0.53) 
 -0.244*** 
(-2.82) 
-0.133 
(-1.55) 
Controls Included Included  Included Included 
Adjusted R2 0.803 0.816  0.801 0.815 
Fixed Effect Y, F Y, F  Y, F Y, F 
N. of Obs. 8611 8587  8176 8211 
Qit-1×ETFit-1:   
(1) = (2) 
    0.97   0.86 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
Table 11: Alternative Explanation III: Financing Channel 
This table presents the results from panel regression of firm-level measures of financing costs and access 
to external capital on the ETF ownership (ETFit-1). In Column (1), the dependent variable is the text-based 
measure of equity-financing constraints developed by Hoberg and Maksimovic (2015). In Column (2), the 
dependent variable is the text-based measure of debt-financing constraints developed by Hoberg and 
Maksimovic (2015). In Column (3), the dependent variable is the annual change of firm Credit Default 
Spread (CDS). In Column (4), the dependent variable is payout ratio, defined as repurchases plus dividends 
scaled by lagged total assets. In Column (5), the dependent variable is the amount of equity issuance scaled 
by total assets. In Column (6), the dependent variable is the amount of debt issuance scaled by total assets. 
Both firm- and year-fixed effects are included. T-statistics, reported in parentheses, are based on standard 
errors clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% two-tailed 
levels, respectively. See Appendix B for definitions of other variables.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 EquityDelay 
Conit 
DebtDelay
Conit 
∆CDSit Payoutit Equity 
Issuranceit 
Debt 
Issuranceit 
ETFit-1 -0.045 
(-1.05) 
0.109*** 
(3.04) 
0.065 
(1.60) 
-0.093*** 
(-2.96) 
-0.285*** 
(-5.22) 
-0.157 
(-1.29) 
Q it-1 0.003*** 
(3.61) 
-0.000 
(-0.05) 
-0.002* 
(-1.94) 
0.001 
(1.59) 
0.028*** 
(14.49) 
0.009*** 
(4.00) 
INSTR it-1 0.003 
(0.67) 
0.006 
(1.41) 
0.016*** 
(3.34) 
-0.008** 
(-2.11) 
-0.020*** 
(-2.83) 
-0.037*** 
(-2.70) 
CF it -0.029*** 
(-5.47) 
-0.001 
(-0.38) 
-0.041*** 
(-4.73) 
0.028*** 
(7.20) 
-0.125*** 
(-9.23) 
-0.010 
(-0.75) 
SIZE it-1 -0.002* 
(-1.75) 
-0.003*** 
(-3.03) 
0.010*** 
(6.78) 
0.008*** 
(7.95) 
-0.022*** 
(-11.33) 
-0.004 
(-1.02) 
RET it+3 -0.002** 
(-2.22) 
-0.000 
(-0.12) 
0.006*** 
(6.03) 
0.000 
(0.10) 
-0.010*** 
(-8.43) 
-0.002 
(-0.74) 
SG it-1 -0.000 
(-0.18) 
0.002** 
(2.21) 
-0.002 
(-1.14) 
-0.006*** 
(-6.19) 
0.005 
(1.14) 
-0.001 
(-0.34) 
CASHit-1 0.011* 
(1.72) 
-0.025*** 
(-5.55) 
-0.000 
(-0.05) 
0.053*** 
(9.47) 
-0.083*** 
(-7.88) 
-0.142*** 
(-9.68) 
LEV it-1 -0.022*** 
(-3.11) 
0.027*** 
(5.00) 
0.003 
(0.63) 
-0.073*** 
(-13.76) 
0.025** 
(2.56) 
-0.067*** 
(-2.81) 
ROA it-1 -0.000 
(-0.01) 
0.000 
(0.02) 
0.021*** 
(3.51) 
0.033*** 
(6.86) 
-0.034** 
(-2.48) 
0.004 
(0.27) 
Adjusted R2 0.686 0.523 0.331 0.504 0.513 0.481 
Fixed Effect Y, F Y, F Y, F Y, F Y, F Y, F 
N. of Obs. 19465 19465 3434 23690 22931 23231 
  
 
Table A1: Replication of Glosten, Nallareddy, and Zou (2016) and Israeli, Lee and 
Sridharan (2017)  
Panel A of this table replicates the results from regressions of annual returns on the interaction of 
earnings and the level and change of ETF ownership following Glosten, Nallareddy, and Zou (2016). 
Earnings measures include systematic earnings and firm-specific earnings. Control variables consist of 
institutional ownership (INSTR it-1), market-to-book value ratio (MBit-1), firm size (SIZEit-1), earning 
volatility (Earnvol it-1), past return (Pastret it-1), and an earnings loss indicator (Loss it-1). Panel B presents 
the results for regressions of stock return synchronicity on ETF ownership controlling for INSTR it-1, 
MBit-1, SIZEit-1 and average share turnover (TURN it-1). Both firm- and year-fixed effects are included. T-
statistics, reported in parentheses, are based on standard errors clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% two-tailed levels, respectively. See Appendix B for 
variable definitions. 
 
 Returnit   Returnit 
Earn_Sysit × ETFit 5.378** 
(2.52) 
 Earn_Sysit × ∆ETFit 15.474*** 
(4.85) 
Earn_Firmit × ETFit -0.645 
(-0.36) 
 Earn_Firmit × ∆ETFit 4.268 
(1.17) 
ETFit 3.596*** 
(11.01) 
 ∆ETFit 3.933*** 
(11.10) 
Earn_Sysit 0.399*** 
(5.39) 
 Earn_Sysit 0.512*** 
(12.56) 
Earn_Firmit 0.496*** 
(6.71) 
 Earn_Firmit 0.469*** 
(11.37) 
 
Controls Included  Controls Included 
Adjusted R2 0.407  Adjusted R2 0.417 
Fixed effect Y,F  Fixed effect Y,F 
N. of Obs. 20444  N. of Obs. 20124 
 
Panel B Dependent variable =SYNCH it (∆ SYNCH it ) 
 SYNCH it   ∆ SYNCH it 
ETF it 3.550*** 
(3.67) 
 ∆ETF it 4.910** 
(2.24) 
INSTR it-1 0.655*** 
(3.71) 
 ∆ INSTR it-1 0.612*** 
(3.54) 
MB it-1 -0.000 
(-1.03) 
 ∆MB it-1 -0.000 
(-1.46) 
SIZE it-1 0.635*** 
(8.48) 
 ∆SIZE it-1 0.388*** 
(5.45) 
TURN it-1 -0.045 
(-0.12) 
 ∆TURN it-1 -0.700 
(-1.25) 
 
Adjusted R2 0.756  Adjusted R2 0.043 
Fixed effect Y,F  Fixed effect Y,F 
N. of Obs. 22330  N. of Obs. 19784 
  
 
Table A2: Subsample Analysis Based on Volatility of Market Beta 
This table reports the results from the regression of firm investments on the interaction term of Tobin’s 
Q and ETF ownership (Q it-1× ETF it-1) conditional on the volatility of a stock’s market beta. BETAVOLit-
2 is a dummy that equals one if the volatility of a firm’s market beta is above the median level for 
the entire sample, and zero otherwise. Both firm- and year-fixed effects are included. T-statistics, 
reported in parentheses, are based on standard errors clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% two-tailed levels, respectively. See Appendix B for definitions of 
other variables.  
 
 CAPXRNDit CAPXit RNDit 
Q it-1× ETF it-1×BETAVOLit-2 0.095** 
(2.44) 
0.029 
(1.21) 
0.064** 
(2.52) 
Q it-1× ETF it-1 0.047 
(1.51) 
0.014 
(0.74) 
0.025 
(1.13) 
Q it-1× BETAVOLit-2 -0.004*** 
(-2.74) 
-0.003*** 
(-2.99) 
-0.002 
(-1.63) 
ETF it-1×BETAVOLit-2 -0.134* 
(-1.93) 
-0.040 
(-0.87) 
-0.082** 
(-1.98) 
Q it-1 0.044*** 
(10.48) 
0.013*** 
(5.48) 
0.029*** 
(8.71) 
ETF it-1 -0.178*** 
(-2.80) 
-0.003 
(-0.07) 
-0.170*** 
(-3.77) 
BETAVOLit-2 0.004 
(1.12) 
0.003 
(1.23) 
0.002 
(0.81) 
ETFRET it-1× BETA it-1×BETAVOL it-2 -0.009* 
(-1.93) 
-0.005* 
(-1.81) 
-0.002 
(-0.73) 
ETFRET it-1× BETA it-1 0.008** 
(2.20) 
0.006** 
(2.40) 
0.000 
(0.25) 
BETA it-1×BETAVOL it-2 0.001 
(0.64) 
0.001 
(1.03) 
-0.000 
(-0.34) 
ETFRET it-1× BETAVOL it-2 0.017** 
(2.42) 
0.016*** 
(3.33) 
-0.001 
(-0.32) 
ETFRET it-1 -0.010** 
(-2.17) 
-0.009*** 
(-2.64) 
0.000 
(0.20) 
BETA it-1 -0.005*** 
(-4.28) 
-0.003*** 
(-4.22) 
-0.001 
(-1.46) 
INST it-1 -0.015** 
(-2.25) 
-0.005 
(-1.16) 
-0.012*** 
(-2.61) 
INST it-1×Q it-1 0.008** 
(2.18) 
0.004** 
(2.09) 
0.004* 
(1.79) 
 
Controls Included Included Included 
Adjusted R2 0.802 0.736 0.902 
Fixed Effect Y, F Y, F Y, F 
N. of Obs. 22663 22663 22663 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Table A3: Controlling for Firm Ownership by (index and active) Mutual Funds and 
Hedge Funds 
This table reports the results from the regression of firm investments on the interaction term of Tobin’s 
Q and ETF ownership (Q it-1× ETF it-1), controlling for firm’s ownership by (non-ETF) index mutual 
funds (IndMFORit-1), active mutual funds (ActMFORit-1), and hedge funds (HFO it-1), and their 
interaction with Tobin’s Q (Q it-1), Both firm- and year-fixed effects are included. T-statistics, reported in 
parentheses, are based on standard errors clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** indicate significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% two-tailed levels, respectively. See Appendix B for definitions of other variables. 
 
 CAPXRNDit CAPXit RNDit 
Q it-1× ETF it-1 0.135*** 
(4.65) 
0.049*** 
(2.71) 
0.074*** 
(3.89) 
PQ jt-1× ETF it-1 -0.154*** 
(-4.31) 
-0.082*** 
(-3.81) 
-0.064** 
(-2.54) 
Q it-1 0.036*** 
(8.30) 
0.009*** 
(3.71) 
0.024*** 
(7.45) 
PQ jt-1 0.005*** 
(3.36) 
0.004*** 
(4.06) 
0.001 
(0.88) 
ETF it-1 0.010 
(0.13) 
0.107** 
(2.17) 
-0.095* 
(-1.84) 
ETFRETit-1×BETA it-1 0.003 
(1.43) 
0.004*** 
(2.63) 
-0.002 
(-1.14) 
ETFRETit-1 -0.001 
(-0.21) 
-0.002 
(-0.79) 
0.002 
(1.06) 
BETA it-1 -0.005*** 
(-4.80) 
-0.003*** 
(-5.14) 
-0.001** 
(-2.06) 
INSTR it-1 0.002 
(0.20) 
0.008 
(1.18) 
-0.009 
(-1.14) 
INSTR it-1×Q it-1 0.003 
(0.50) 
-0.001 
(-0.38) 
0.005 
(1.21) 
IndMFOR it-1 -0.049 
(-0.37) 
0.038 
(0.46) 
-0.089 
(-1.01) 
IndMFORit-1×Q it-1 0.096 
(1.42) 
-0.001 
(-0.01) 
0.095* 
(1.88) 
ActMFORit-1 -0.012 
(-0.60) 
-0.020 
(-1.60) 
0.008 
(0.65) 
ActMFOR it-1×Q it-1 -0.006 
(-0.57) 
0.009 
(1.47) 
-0.015** 
(-2.02) 
HFO it-1 -0.030 
(-1.43) 
0.008 
(0.59) 
-0.042*** 
(-2.96) 
HFO it-1×Q it-1 0.026** 
(2.38) 
0.003 
(0.57) 
0.024*** 
(2.92) 
    
Controls Included Included Included 
Adjusted R2 0.805 0.738 0.907 
Fixed Effect Y, F Y, F Y, F 
N. of Obs. 21805 21805 21805 
 
 
  
 
Table A4:  The Effects of ETFs on Insider Trading Profitability 
This table reports the results from Fama-MacBeth regression of monthly stock return on insiders’ net 
purchase ratio (NPR) and its interaction with ETF ownership (ETF). NPR is the net purchase ratio of 
insiders over past 6 months following Laknishok and Lee (2001). Ret(-1) is the past 1-month return. 
LogBM is the natural log of Book-to-Market ratio. MOM is the past 12-month stock returns.  *, **, and 
*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% two-tailed levels, respectively. See Appendix B for 
definitions of other variables.  
 
  (1) (2) 
NPR 0.0047*** 0.0052*** 
 (3.92) (2.98) 
NPR*ETF 0.1264* 0.1023* 
 (1.80) (1.92) 
ETF -0.0159 0.0085 
 (-0.15) (0.11) 
NPR*Size  -0.0004* 
  (-1.87) 
NPR*INSTR  0.0006 
  (0.37) 
Ret(-1)  -0.0251*** 
  (-3.14) 
Size  -0.0015*** 
  (-2.65) 
LogBM  0.0012 
  (1.17) 
MOM  -0.0032 
  (-0.79) 
INSTR  0.0057** 
  (2.09) 
Constant 0.0111** 0.0156** 
 (2.23) (2.46) 
Adjusted R2 0.008 0.046 
N.of Obs. 409098 377585 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
